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Organizational control, defined as efforts to increase the chances that employees of an 
organization work toward achieving organizational goals, is believed to have positive effects on 
performance. However, few studies have tested this assumption. This research draws on theories 
of control and coordination to investigate the relationship between control and information 
systems (IS) development performance. 
It consists of analyses of two research models, one at the individual level of analysis, and 
the other at the team level of analysis. The individual-level model investigates how control 
affects individual effort toward task and individual coordination success, and proposes that these 
relationships are moderated by controlees’ perceptions of how effectively a controller can 
monitor their work behaviors and outcomes. The team-level model investigates two mediators 
through which control may affect IS development performance: team effort toward task, and 
team coordination success. A field survey was conducted, and completed matched survey 
responses from 106 managers and team members involved in 36 different IS development 
projects were used to test the hypotheses. 
The results suggest that control does have a positive relationship with effort toward task 
and coordination success. Specifically, clan control was positively associated with coordination 
success at the individual and team levels, and with team effort toward task. Outcome control was 
positively associated with individual effort toward task. In addition, the relationship between 
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outcome control and individual effort toward task was moderated by team member perceptions  
of  the difficulty of observing outcomes. At high levels of difficulty of observing outcomes, high 
levels of outcome control resulted in higher effort than at low levels of difficulty of observing 
outcomes. 
Control was also positively related to performance outcomes. Behavior control was 
associated with reduced overruns of resources such as time, budget, and systems and 
programming effort. Outcome control was positively associated with product performance, 
which represents the quality, ease-of-use, and functionality of the system developed or enhanced 
by the project. Clan control was associated with both improved product performance and reduced 
resource overruns. 
No support was found for mediation of the effects of control on performance by effort 
toward task or coordination success. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Despite decades of research and practitioner experimentation, a large percentage of information 
systems development projects still take longer than anticipated, go over budget, fail to meet the 
expectations of project stakeholders, or are canceled before their completion (Faraj and 
Sambamurthy 2006; Mahaney and Lederer 2006). Statistics from two recent Standish Group 
reports highlight the failure of information systems development projects to reach their goals. 
The 1999 Standish Group report indicates that only 26% of software development projects are 
completed on time and within budget, and meet their requirements. And performance is not 
improving significantly over time, as the 2004 Standish Group report indicates that only 29% of 
software development projects are completed on time and within budget, and meet their 
requirements (Standish Group statistics as reported in Aiyer et al. 2006). This is a very important 
problem, as more than $275 billion is spent every year in the United States on software 
development (Aiyer et al. 2006). Moreover, much of this total spending is on in-house software 
development. Total spending on IT outsourcing in the U.S. is approaching $50 billion (Gray 
2006), which is a large figure, but still small in comparison to the total amount spent on software 
development. Offshoring, while an important and growing phenomenon, accounts for still less of 
total software development expenditures in the United States. The largest offshoring partner of 
the United States, India, exported only $18 billion in software and services during the fiscal year 
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ending March 31, 2007 (National Association of Software and Service Companies 2007), and 
this total includes exports to countries other than the United States. 
Because so much is being spent on information systems development in the U.S. it is 
important to consider why software development efforts frequently fail. One possible reason for 
these failures is that information systems development efforts are not being controlled 
successfully. Organizational control, or ensuring that employees of an organization work toward 
achieving the goals of the organization, is one of the fundamental functions of management. In 
the information systems development context, control is generally conceived of as mechanisms 
used by upper management and IS management, as representatives of the organization, to help 
ensure that the developers, analysts, and other individuals who are involved with the 
development of the information system are acting in agreed-upon ways toward accomplishing 
organizational objectives (Kirsch 1996). Organizational goals for information systems 
development typically include producing a system within a specified amount of time and within 
a specified budget. Moreover, the system produced should be reliable, and its users should be 
willing and able to use it for its intended purpose. Because control is meant to facilitate the 
achievement of organizational goals, control efforts that can be considered successful are those 
that help lead to the achievement of those goals. Given this definition, we can argue that control 
efforts have not been very successful in the context of information systems development. 
Organizational control has been studied for decades, and many business activities seem to 
be amenable to control by management. Why is it, then, that control efforts do not seem to work 
as well in the context of information systems development? Are there certain characteristics of 
the IS development context that make it difficult to control? Through what mechanisms do 
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control efforts affect performance in the IS development context? These are the broad questions 
that are addressed in this research. 
In order to answer these broad questions this dissertation investigates in more detail the 
mechanisms through which control affects information systems development performance. The 
relationship between control and performance has not been extensively studied, perhaps because 
of a prevailing belief that a manager chooses what type of control to utilize based on certain 
antecedent conditions, and that if the correct control mode is chosen performance will naturally 
improve. The lack of successful control of IS development projects suggests that this belief 
needs to be reconsidered. Even if the fit between antecedent conditions and control mode has an 
effect on performance outcomes it is still useful to consider the mechanisms through which 
control affects performance outcomes independently of the question of fit between control mode 
and antecedent conditions. Managers may have other reasons for choosing particular control 
modes, such as comfort and familiarity, or a desire to impress their own manager. Moreover, 
projects are ever-changing and a control mode that seems to fit based on an initial assessment of 
antecedent conditions may no longer fit after the project gets underway and things change. For 
these reasons we cannot assume that the control mode utilized always fits the conditions of the 
project. 
 The mechanisms through which control is expected to affect performance are proposed 
to work at both the individual level and the team level. Thus the research will be conducted with 
two separate research models and analyses, one at each level of analysis. The first analysis, at the 
individual level, investigates how control affects individual effort toward task and individual 
coordination success, and how these relationships may be moderated by controlees’ perceptions 
of how effectively a controller can monitor their work behaviors and outcomes in the particular 
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task context of the IS development project. The second analysis, at the team level, investigates 
the effects of control on IS development project performance outcomes. It proposes that team 
effort toward task and team coordination success play a mediating role in the relationship 
between control and project performance outcomes. In addition to improving our understanding 
of control in the specific context of IS development, this dissertation will also contribute to our 
understanding of the control of complex knowledge work in general. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 MODES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 
Organizational control has long been considered one of the primary functions of management, 
along with planning, organizing, and coordination (Fayol 1949). This research adopts a 
behavioral view of control. In this view control refers to attempts by management or other 
organizational stakeholders to increase the probability that individuals in the organization will 
follow agreed-upon behaviors that lead to the attainment of organizational objectives (Kirsch 
1996; Flamholtz et al. 1985; Jaworski 1988). 
The modes used to enact control in organizations have been classified in various ways, 
but most classification schemes have made a general distinction between formal and informal 
control modes. Formal controls are those that are documented by management, that implicitly 
assume a discrepancy between the goals of the organization and the goals of its individual 
members, and that are initiated and maintained by management. Informal controls, by contrast, 
are typically undocumented, may or may not be in line with the goals of management, and are 
usually initiated and maintained by the organization’s members (Jaworski 1988).  
Formal control modes are attempts to control individuals in organizations through the 
monitoring of behaviors or outputs, comparing behaviors or outputs to some pre-specified 
standard, and then attempting to adjust the behaviors, and consequently the outputs as well, by 
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administering rewards or sanctions based on how closely they conform to the pre-specified 
standards. Formal control modes are usually classified into behavior control and outcome control 
(Ouchi and Maguire 1975; Ouchi 1977). Behavior control involves specifying behaviors for 
individuals to follow and then applying sanctions or rewards based on their compliance or lack 
of compliance with the specified behaviors. Outcome control involves specifying desired 
outcomes and rewarding or sanctioning individuals based on whether or not they attain the 
desired outcomes. 
The classification of formal controls into behavior and outcome control emphasizes the 
types of phenomena for which goals or targets are being specified, and that are subsequently 
observed and measured. Another way of looking at behavior and outcome controls focuses on 
time. Behavior controls are applied while the task is taking place, and outcome controls are 
applied after the task is completed (Jaworski 1988). This time-based perspective is a useful way 
to consider formal controls, because it makes the concept of risk more salient. Since outcome 
controls are applied after the activity is already completed, a manager may not be able to 
recognize that they are ineffective until it is too late. With behavior control, however, there is 
less risk as adjustments may be made as the activity is ongoing. This time-based perspective on 
control is important because it explains a powerful motivator for managers to attempt to 
implement behavior control rather than outcome control, or to implement outcome control based 
on intermediate outcomes in addition to final outcomes. 
In addition to the formal modes of control, control can also be enacted in organizations 
through the influence of norms and values established in various social units. These informal 
modes of control are typically classified according to the level of the social unit (Jaworski 1988). 
They shape behavior through shared norms and values that members of the social unit internalize 
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through socialization processes, eliminating or reducing the need for explicit formal control 
mechanisms (Orlikowski 1991). Some examples are cultural control, which operates at the 
organizational level, social or small group control, which operates at the level of an 
organizational subunit, and professional control, which can be thought of as operating at the 
super-organizational level, driven by the norms and practices of a particular profession. Another 
informal mode of control is clan control. A clan refers to a group of people who share values, 
beliefs, and agreement among members as to what constitutes proper behavior. The clan can 
implement control in an organization through rituals and ceremonies that reward those who share 
the attitudes and values of the clan, and which are supposed by the clan members to be likely to 
lead to organizational success. An organization can attempt to utilize clan control through 
selection processes that emphasize hiring individuals who share the goals and values of the 
organization, and through socialization or indoctrination processes which emphasize these goals 
and values and attempt to inculcate them into the organization’s members (Ouchi 1979). 
Although the social control modes have been given various names, they all work through similar 
mechanisms. In the IS development context, clan control has been identified as an important 
control mode (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1996, 1997, 
2004; Kirsch et al. 2002). In addition to the formal modes of control, this study will also examine 
how clan control affects IS development performance. 
The existing conceptualizations of informal controls are not as clear as those for formal 
control. For example, clan control may be understood as the actions undertaken by an 
organization to try to develop a clan, as the existence of a clan in the organization, or as the 
actions that clan members take to control their own behavior and the behavior of others in the 
clan. One reason conceptualizations of informal control are not as clear may be that they have 
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not been studied as extensively, because business studies tend to focus on the role of managers 
and what they can do to improve organizational performance. The role of managers in 
implementing formal controls is much clearer than the role of managers in implementing 
informal controls. This study will conceive of and measure clan control as the presence of a clan 
and operation of clan control mechanisms. Specifically, when the project-related behaviors of 
team members are influenced by shared norms and values and a common vision of the project, 
and when project team members attempt to be accepted as “regular” members of the project 
team, clan control is operating. The question of how the clan emerged, and whether or not 
management played a role in that emergence, will not be addressed in this dissertation. 
2.2 CONTROL MODE ANTECEDENTS 
Much of the theory and research related to organizational control has focused on the antecedent 
conditions that lead to the use of the various modes of control. The paradigm adopted by most of 
this research is inherently rational and prescriptive. That is, the antecedents are believed to 
determine which control modes will be most effective in various circumstances, and from there it 
is assumed that the most effective control modes are the ones that will be used. Because control 
consists of observing and monitoring behavior or outputs and then applying sanctions or rewards 
based upon how closely the behavior or outputs conform to a pre-specified standard, factors that 
affect the controller’s ability to monitor and pre-specify behavior or outputs have been 
considered to be important antecedents of the control mode utilized. Antecedents investigated 
have focused on properties of the task being controlled and the task-related knowledge of the 
controller. Three key antecedents have been identified: outcome measurability, behavior 
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observability, and the controller’s knowledge of the process by which inputs are transformed into 
outputs. In order for an organization to utilize outcome control, there must be agreement on 
acceptable outcomes, and these outcomes must be measurable. For behavior control to be 
utilized, the controller must have or believe he has sufficient knowledge of the process by which 
inputs are transformed into outputs to specify appropriate behaviors for individuals performing 
the task. These two antecedents have a long history in the organizational literature (Ouchi 1977; 
Perrow 1965; Reeves and Woodward 1970; Thompson 1967). Another necessary condition for 
behavior control is that the behavior of individuals performing the task must be observable so 
that the controller can monitor behavior for compliance to what he believes is the appropriate 
behavior for accomplishing the task (Eisenhardt 1985). 
Research on control mode antecedents has suggested that informal control modes may be 
used when it is infeasible to use formal control modes, or may be combined with formal control 
modes in a portfolio of control modes. 
2.3 PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF CONTROL 
The ultimate goal of organizational control efforts is to improve performance. However, there is 
relatively little research on control in the information systems context that reports relationships 
between control and performance. Henderson and Lee (1992) examined the effects of managerial 
behavior and outcome control and team-member self-control and outcome control in teams 
involved in information systems design. Their conceptualization of managerial behavior and 
outcome control was similar to what we have discussed as formal behavior and outcome control. 
Managerial behavior control encompassed the degree to which managers clarified team member 
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roles, defined and provided team members with specific work assignments, and developed 
procedures to guide the team members’ work. Their conceptualization of managerial outcome 
control emphasized managerial feedback to team members regarding their performance. Team 
member self-control refers to the degree to which team members have freedom to do their work 
in their own way, and team member outcome control refers to the degree to which team members 
provide each other with feedback on their performance. Henderson and Lee examined three 
performance variables – efficiency, which represented adherence to budgets and schedules, 
effectiveness, which represented quality work and interactions and ability to meet project goals, 
and elapsed time, which represented the team’s ability to work quickly while maintaining 
quality. Managerial behavior control was significantly correlated with all three performance 
variables, while managerial outcome control was significantly correlated with efficiency only. 
Team member outcome control was significantly correlated with all three performance variables, 
while team member self-control was significantly correlated only with the effectiveness 
performance variable. The combination of high managerial behavior control and high team 
member outcome control resulted in the highest average scores on the three performance 
variables. 
Kirsch and Cummings (1996) performed a post-hoc analysis and found that perceived 
self-control of both project leaders and IS managers was significantly and positively related to a 
composite measure of performance that measured whether systems satisfied user requirements, 
conformed to internal IS standards, and were completed on time and within budget. Their 
conceptualization of self control was that the IS managers or project leaders had control over or 
influence on the setting of project goals, were rewarded for working on their own without 
significant direction from others, and were intrinsically motivated to achieve project objectives.   
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These studies provide some insights on the performance effects of control in the IS 
development context, but more work on the relationship between control and performance is 
needed. Researchers in other business fields have also noted that little research has been 
conducted linking organizational control to performance consequences (Lawler 1976; Otley 
1980; Jaworski 1988), and the results of the research that has been conducted has been equivocal 
(Challagalla and Shervani 1996).  
2.4 CONTROL AND COORDINATION 
Along with control, coordination, or the management of dependencies between activities 
(Malone and Crowston 1994), is another concept that is central to organizational theory. 
Although they are usually considered separately in contemporary organizational literature, their 
definitions and the operationalizations with which they are measured frequently overlap, to the 
point where some studies of control look more like studies of coordination and some studies of 
coordination look more like studies of control. It may be useful to consider them together and 
attempt to more clearly understand their relationship, as well as the central ideas which 
distinguish them from one another. 
The close link between coordination and control has its roots in organizational theory. 
March and Simon (1958) argued that most problem solving activity in organizations is governed 
by performance programs, which are complex and organized sets of responses to environmental 
stimuli. If a performance program does not exist for a certain set of environmental stimuli, then 
the problem solving activity may involve search for alternatives that may involve inventing new 
performance programs. March and Simon suggest that these performance programs are intended 
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to fulfill two functions, control and coordination. They control employees by specifying standard 
operating procedures and attaching rewards and penalties to them. They aid coordination by 
increasing interdepartmental predictability. Further, March and Simon suggest that the ability of 
performance programs to serve as organizational controls is predicated on their being linked to 
variables that are observable and measurable. They suggest that program content is a function of 
the ease of observing job activities, the ease of observing job output, and the ease of relating 
activities to output. Because of the coordinating function of performance programs, their content 
should also be linked to the organization’s coordination needs. The more closely members of the 
organization need to coordinate their activities the more likely that programs will specify activity 
patterns and pacing of activities. However, if members need to coordinate their outputs, then the 
programs will tend to specify product characteristics.  
Galbraith (1974) conceived of organizations as collections of specialist subgroups which 
utilize resources and perform subtasks that must be integrated to produce outputs. The concern of 
these subgroups is how to coordinate their interdependent subtasks, given varying levels of 
uncertainty, in order to achieve organizational goals. The higher the level of uncertainty faced by 
an organization the greater the need for that organization to process information in order to 
coordinate the interdependent subtasks. Processing information is done through organizational 
structures that are referred to as “coordination structures” or “integrating structures.” Galbraith 
(1974) discussed three different coordination structures: 1) rules, routines, and procedures; 2) 
hierarchy; and 3) goal or target setting.  
Rules, routines, and procedures are used to coordinate behavior between interdependent 
subtasks when situations can be predicted in advance and appropriate behaviors can be specified 
for those situations. When situations are more uncertain and appropriate behavior cannot be 
 12 
specified in advance the hierarchy is used on an exception basis. Hierarchy refers to 
centralization of authority to make decisions that resolve uncertainty. As uncertainty increases, 
the hierarchy can become overloaded and coordination is increasingly enacted through 
specification of goals or targets. Goal or target setting actually refers to something akin to 
decentralization of decision-making authority. It refers to managers setting goals or targets and 
allowing employees at the lower levels of the organization some autonomy in how they meet 
those goals.  
Thus we can see that organizational theorists have recognized that the same 
organizational structures can affect both coordination and control. Moreover, they have 
recognized that both coordination and control have antecedents related to the degree to which 
activities or behaviors can be specified in advance, the degree to which outputs can be observed 
and measured, and knowledge of the relationship between activities and outputs. However, 
because they were concerned with organizational structures, the organizational theorists did not 
clearly distinguish between coordination and control, and did not clearly distinguish coordination 
and control from organizational structure. They were concerned with organizational structures 
that facilitated the coordination of interdependent work to achieve organizational goals. Issues of 
power, decision-making authority, and goal alignment are implicit in this concern. 
Ouchi (1977) clearly distinguished control efforts from organizational structure and 
conceived of control as being enacted through two modes, behavior control and outcome control. 
Behavior control is based on the monitoring and evaluation of behavior, and outcome control is 
based on the monitoring and evaluation of outputs (Ouchi and Maguire 1975). Malone and 
Crowston (1994) synthesize views of coordination from various disciplines, defining 
coordination as “managing dependencies between activities” (p. 90). This definition, too, clearly 
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distinguishes coordination from organizational structure. However, we can see that elements of 
Galbraith’s view of organizational structures are found in the more contemporary definitions of 
both coordination and control. Managing of dependencies among tasks, Malone and Crowston’s 
definition of coordination, is central to Galbraith’s view. Moreover, we can also see the ideas of 
behavior control in the idea of coordinating behavior through rules, routines, and procedures 
which specify behaviors for organizational actors to follow. Outcome control is reflected in 
Galbraith’s ideas on the coordination of actions through the specification of goals or targets.  
Although control and coordination have been intertwined in organizational theory, we 
propose that it is useful to clearly distinguish them conceptually, but to examine them both 
within the same research model in order to gain a more fine-grained view of how they interrelate, 
how they are used in organizations, and the effects they have on organizational performance. We 
have defined control above as attempts by management or other organizational stakeholders to 
increase the probability that individuals in the organization will follow agreed-upon behaviors 
that lead to the attainment of organizational objectives (Kirsch 1996; Flamholtz et al. 1985; 
Jaworski 1988). Typically, control mechanisms are those by which the organization specifies and 
monitors employee behaviors or outputs, evaluates them, and then provides rewards or sanctions 
(Ouchi 1977) in order to ensure that employees work toward the goals of the organization. 
Coordination, on the other hand, involves the management of dependencies between activities 
(Malone and Crowston 1994), such as shared resource dependencies, producer/consumer 
constraints, simultaneity constraints, and task/subtask relationships. 
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3.0  RESEARCH MODELS AND HYPOTHESES 
The research questions were addressed by analyzing two separate research models. The first 
research model is at the individual level of analysis, and investigates the effects of control on 
effort expended toward the task and on coordination success. Also addressed in the first research 
model are the role of controlees’ perceptions of the observability and measurability of their 
behaviors and the outcomes of their work. Specifically, difficulty of observing behaviors and 
difficulty of measuring outcomes are proposed to moderate the effects of behavior control and 
outcome control, respectively, on effort toward task. 
The second research model is at the team level of analysis. In this model relationships 
between the control modes and performance outcomes are proposed. In addition, effort toward 
task and coordination success are proposed as mediators in the relationship between control and 
performance outcomes. 
There were several reasons for dividing the research into two research models and two 
separate analyses. First, both moderation and mediation effects are being tested, and it is difficult 
to test both within the same research model, particularly when the sample size provided by the 
research data is expected to be small. Second, some of the constructs of interest used to answer 
the research questions are best addressed at the individual level of analysis, and some are best 
addressed at the team level of analysis. For example, performance outcomes such as adherence to 
budget, schedule, and resource allocations are team-level outcomes. Other constructs, such as the 
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team member’s perception of the manager’s difficulty of observing his or her behaviors, make 
more sense as individual-level constructs. Dividing the research into two separate research 
models and two separate analyses allows each construct of interest to be investigated at the level 
of analysis that is most suitable for that construct. 
3.1 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The individual-level research model is presented below in Figure 1. The following sections 
describe the model in more detail, and introduce the hypotheses that will be tested. 
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Outcome Control
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Informal Control
Individual
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Figure 1:  Individual-Level Research Model 
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3.1.1 Effects of control on effort toward task  
In considering organizational outcomes of control, it is useful to think about the mechanisms 
through which these outcomes occur, in particular the mediating factors through which control 
processes may have an effect on organizational outcomes. Two primary mediating factors will be 
examined here. Control efforts are proposed to work through motivating effort toward the task, 
and by improving the coordination among individual controlees or subsets of controlees. The 
individual-level research model and analysis will investigate the effects of control on the 
mediating factors. Whether or not mediation actually occurs will be tested in the analysis of the 
team-level research model. 
Control is thought to affect performance by motivating individuals to work toward the 
goals of the organization (Flamholtz 1979; Flamholtz et al. 1985). Motivation has been 
frequently studied in the management literature, and is typically described as encompassing the 
direction, level, and persistence of effort expended (Jones 1955; Campbell and Pritchard 1976). 
Other researchers argue that motivation is a psychological state that leads to effort (Brown and 
Peterson 1994). Thus, the effects of control on performance can be thought of as mediated by 
effort. Effort can be characterized by its direction, level, and persistence. Direction refers to the 
target of the effort. For example, an individual can direct his effort towards many activities, such 
as working on an assigned task, socializing with coworkers, or surfing the net. Level of effort 
refers to how much of the individual’s resources are being expended toward the target of the 
effort, and persistence of effort refers to how long the effort is maintained.  
Control mechanisms can be expected to direct effort toward task-related targets and/or 
increase the level and persistence of effort expended toward task-related targets. Behavior 
control works by specifying behaviors that are appropriate for successful completion of the task, 
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and thus are inherently task-related. When individuals believe that a controller is observing their 
behavior and basing rewards and sanctions on how their behavior complies with what was 
specified, those individuals will be more likely to direct their effort toward the specified task-
related behaviors. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1: Behavior control will have a positive relationship with individual effort toward task  
Outcome control works through the setting of goals or targets related to task 
performance. Because of the sanctions or rewards tied to them, these goals can be expected to 
motivate individuals to direct their effort toward task-related behaviors that will result in their 
achievement. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Outcome control will have a positive relationship with individual effort toward task 
When we consider control of complex, knowledge-intensive activities, taking into 
account the nature of knowledge work and the antecedents addressed in the literature, it makes 
sense that informal control modes would serve as important complements to formal control 
modes. It was argued above that formal behavior and outcome controls can only control a limited 
set of outputs and behaviors – those that are visible to and understood by the controller, who is 
typically conceived of as a manager or client liaison. It is likely that many of the behaviors and 
outputs that are difficult for a controller to observe may be more easily observed by the 
individuals and team members involved in the activity. In addition, whereas existing control 
theory focuses on the knowledge of the controller, in the context of complex knowledge work 
much of the knowledge of how to transform inputs into outputs resides in the controlees. This 
knowledge should also be considered when determining appropriate control modes. Informal 
control modes may be important for the control of complex knowledge work because informal 
control modes utilize the knowledge and ability to observe of the participants in the activity, the 
controlees. Thus, there is the potential for individual participants in the activity to utilize clan 
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control to control parts of the activity that are not amenable to formal control modes. Because of 
this, informal control modes can be valuable complements to formal control modes, especially in 
the case of controlling a complex, knowledge-intensive activity, because they utilize the 
participants as agents of control, and this takes advantage of their understanding of the 
transformation process, their ability to observe the behavior of themselves and other participants, 
and their ability to observe and understand a broader range of relevant task outcomes. 
Informal controls such as clan control work also can work through goal congruence 
rather than through the application of awards and sanctions. This implies that the controlees 
share the goals of the organization, and the ability of management (the controller) to monitor the 
controlees’ behaviors and outputs are no longer relevant to the amount of effort the controlee 
expends on the task. The controlee will expend effort toward the task because he or she shares 
the goal of successful task completion with the organization. Moreover, in the presence of clan 
control the controlee will be motivated to avoid non-task-related behaviors and dysfunctional 
behaviors because they decrease the chances of goal attainment. These observations lead to the 
following hypothesis:  
H3: Clan control will have a positive relationship with individual effort toward task 
3.1.2 Effects of control on coordination success 
Although the definitions we have presented for control and coordination are distinct, those used 
by organizational researchers have tended to overlap and intertwine. For example, Sherif et al. 
(2006) note that coordination mechanisms “…serve to increase the likelihood that each agent 
makes decisions consistent with the overall welfare of the organization” (p. 343), and they list 
monitoring work processes and rewarding cooperative behaviors, as well as facilitating 
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communication, as mechanisms of coordination. Monitoring and rewarding are fundamental 
components of control. 
Part of the confusion between coordination and control lies in the contemporary 
researchers’ attention to mechanisms, just as earlier organizational theorists focused on 
organizational structures. Although coordination and control can be considered distinct 
conceptually, in practice many mechanisms used in organizations can have effects on both 
coordination and control. For example, Kraut and Streeter (1995) and Faraj and Sproull (2000) 
investigated coordination in software development projects. Kraut and Streeter operationalized 
formal impersonal coordination procedures as the use of project documents and memos, project 
milestones and delivery schedules, modification request and error tracking procedures, and data 
dictionaries. Formal interpersonal coordination procedures were operationalized as status review 
meetings, design review meetings, and code inspections. Faraj and Sproull, drawing on Kraut 
and Streeter’s measure, operationalized administrative coordination as the extent of the project’s  
use of formal policies and procedures for coordinating the team’s work, project milestones and 
delivery schedules, project documents and memos, regularly scheduled team meetings, 
requirements/design review meetings, and design inspections. These measures of coordination 
rely on measuring the use of certain mechanisms in organizations. However, the same 
mechanisms have also been used as measures of control. For example, Kirsch (1997) includes 
meetings, progress reports, walk-throughs, and project plans as mechanisms of behavior control. 
Thus, although control and coordination are distinct concepts, they may be implemented through 
overlapping sets of mechanisms. Because of this we propose that control efforts can affect 
performance through improving coordination.  
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This effect of control efforts on coordination may occur because controlling complex 
work tasks requires them to be made more visible through the production of an artifact or a 
concrete representation of the work. Such representations of work may make the work of 
individuals more visible to other individuals with whom their work is interdependent, and this 
visibility of work should facilitate coordination. Control mechanisms may also serve to pace the 
progress of work, which may help to temporally coordinate the actions of various parties 
involved in the information systems development process. Finally, some control mechanisms, 
such as meetings, may facilitate task-related communication among parties involved in 
information systems development. This communication helps to improve coordination. Each of 
these possibilities is examined in more detail below.   
Behavior control mechanisms rely on specifying, monitoring, and evaluating behavior. In 
order to monitor and evaluate behavior it must be made visible in some way to the controller. 
Many behavior control mechanisms make behavior or outcomes visible in some way, or require 
the production of a representation of work. This visibility can also be used to support 
coordination. Alternatively, the information used for control may actually arise from 
mechanisms implemented to influence coordination. Suchman (1995, p. 59) notes that 
“technologies designed for the coordination of complex distributed activities are commonly used 
as well for reporting on those activities, as a basis for centralized assessments of the efficiency 
and correctness of the local operations in which the technologies are embedded. In this way 
technologies for the local coordination of work become incorporated into interests of global 
control.”  
Behavior control mechanisms can also improve coordination by specifying the pace of 
work, and providing natural synchronization points such as scheduled milestones and meetings. 
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Finally, control efforts may influence coordination by providing opportunities for task-
related interaction among individuals whose work is interdependent. Both Kraut and Streeter 
(1995) and Faraj and Sproull (2000) consider two dimensions of coordination. Kraut and Streeter 
make a distinction between formal and informal coordination, and Faraj and Sproull make a 
distinction between administrative coordination and expertise coordination. Formal or 
administrative coordination is usually mandated from a higher level in the organizational 
hierarchy and may involve the coordination of more tangible or economic resources such as 
office space, time, and financial resources. Kraut and Streeter’s informal coordination, 
contrastingly, is operationalized by group meetings and collocation, which provide opportunities 
for individuals to communicate with each other and coordinate their work. Similarly, Faraj and 
Sproull’s expertise coordination involves individuals having knowledge of each others’ 
expertise, knowing where that expertise is needed in the group process, and bringing it to bear. 
Thus informal coordination and expertise coordination are not as closely tied to organizational 
structure, but are more micro interaction processes that occur between individuals. Gittell (2002) 
refers to these micro coordination processes as relational coordination. Behavior control 
mechanisms may also require people working on the same project to attend meetings together. 
This offers them an opportunity to interact and coordinate with each other in informal ways. 
H4: Behavior control will have a positive relationship with individual coordination success 
Clan control is also expected to positively influence coordination success. When clan 
control is operating task-related behavior is influenced by shared goals and values, and a 
common vision of the project. In addition, individuals attempt to be accepted as “regular” 
members of the team. Shared goals and values and a common vision of the project can be 
expected to improve coordination success because they increase the likelihood that team 
members work in similar ways, and that team members understand the ways that other team 
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members work. In addition, team members who are attempting to be accepted as “regular” 
members of the project team will likely make efforts to make their work understood by other, 
and to understand the work of others, so that they can avoid being perceived as a poor worker or 
an obstacle. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: Clan control will have a positive relationship with individual coordination success 
3.1.3 Moderating effect of controlees’ perceptions of the task context 
The nature of the task, as characterized by its behavior observability and outcome measurability, 
is central to theory on organizational control. The current framework for understanding of 
control modes and their antecedents, which informs much of the existing research on control, 
was developed in the context of relatively simple industrial tasks and was meant to be applicable 
to line workers and their managers (Cardinal 2001). However, complex work tasks, particularly 
those that involve knowledge work, have become increasingly common and important to 
business firms. Information systems development is such a task. Knowledge work is defined as 
work that produces information and knowledge (Machlup 1962; Stehr 1994), involves 
manipulation of abstractions and symbols (Fuller 1992), requires creativity and is difficult to 
routinize (Drucker 1993).  The changing nature of work, particularly the increasing prevalence of 
knowledge work, should motivate us to modify and extend our understanding of organizational 
control (Walsh et al. 2006). 
The current understanding of the role of task characteristics in control theory treats task 
characteristics such as behavior observability and outcome measurability as antecedents to 
control mode choice. Along with the controller’s knowledge of the process by which inputs are 
turned into outputs, these characteristics of the task are thought to determine the appropriate 
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control type or types to be used to control the task. In addition, it is assumed that if a controller is 
able to observe behavior, then he will be able to determine whether or not the behavior conforms 
to what has been specified.  
This simplistic view of task and focus on the knowledge possessed by the controller, 
typically understood to be a manager, is adequate when applied to relatively simple tasks.  
However, in complex tasks involving knowledge work, such as information systems 
development, tasks are accomplished through a range of behaviors, some of which are easily 
observable and some of which are difficult to observe. Moreover, simple observation of behavior 
may be inadequate for the manager to make a determination of whether or not the behavior is 
conforming to what has been pre-specified.  For example, coding is one of the fundamental 
activities of information systems development. However, it would be very difficult and costly for 
a manager to pre-specify appropriate coding behaviors, and then monitor the coding behavior to 
make sure it conforms to the pre-specified behaviors. It is possible to observe that an individual 
is coding, but difficult to observe whether or not the individual is writing code that will be 
efficient and effective. In order to do so, the manager would have to read and comprehend the 
code himself. Thus, while it may be easy to observe whether or not an individual is coding, it is 
very difficult to pre-specify appropriate coding behaviors and determine whether or not they are 
being followed. 
Moreover, complex tasks may have some facets that are well-understood by the 
controller and others that are not well-understood by the controller. For example, systems 
development, at least for the development of large systems, is an activity that requires the 
coordination of many interdependent actors. Systems are usually too large and complex for any 
one person to completely understand, and the domain knowledge necessary to build a system is 
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usually spread throughout an organization (Curtis et al. 1988; Walz et al. 1993). Thus, while an 
individual may have a good understanding of the processes in general which are used to create 
systems, the detailed knowledge of how a specific system works is distributed among many 
individuals.  
  Similarly, outcomes associated with a complex task have varying levels of 
measurability. In the information systems development context some outputs, such as the 
function of the system, may be measured through testing, but others, such as system quality or 
extensibility, are more difficult to observe and measure. 
Thus, whereas the traditional way of looking at control treats the task as a monolithic 
entity and answers the question of what type of control should be used to control the task, given 
the task’s characteristics, when we are studying the performance outcomes of control in a 
complex knowledge work task context where the manager may be unable to observe, 
comprehend, and measure all of the different types of behaviors and outcomes that are associated 
with such a task context, a more appropriate question to ask may be how effective will different 
modes of control be, given the task’s characteristics. To answer this question we need to turn our 
attention away from choice of control mode and instead focus on the mechanisms through which 
control may affect performance, and how those mechanisms may be affected by different task 
characteristics. To do so we must also turn our attention away from the manager’s control mode 
choice, and instead consider the role of the controlee in more detail. 
We have proposed effort toward task as one of the primary mediators of control’s effect 
on performance, and proposed that control has the effect of increasing effort toward task. The 
ability of control efforts to influence individual effort is expected to be moderated by task 
characteristics because task characteristics affect the controlees’ perceptions of how difficult it is 
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for the controller to observe and/or comprehend their behaviors or measure the outcomes of their 
work. That is, if the controlee believes that the controller is not able to effectively observe many 
of the behaviors associated with his or her work and determine whether or not they meet pre-
specified standards, then behavior control may be expected to be less effective. Similarly, if the 
controlee believes that many of the outcomes associated with the project are difficult for the 
controller to accurately measure, then this limits the ability of outcome control mechanisms to 
motivate the controlee. This is because the controlee knows that under these conditions his work 
is unlikely to be rewarded, since the controller will have difficulty observing his work behaviors 
and measuring his outcomes. Moreover, the controlee has an incentive to free ride, because 
under these conditions his lack of effort and the outcomes of his lack of effort are also difficult to 
observe and measure. 
Ouchi (1979) points out that extensive use of formal control modes may alienate 
employees by offending their sense of autonomy and self control and lead to unenthusiastic, 
perfunctory work. Perfunctory work may be understood as creating the illusion of working on a 
task, but not actually expending much effort toward the task. Jaworski (1988) adds that control 
systems that consist of imperfect measurement systems may result in dysfunctional behaviors 
such as gaming, smoothing, focusing, and invalid reporting. These effects may be particularly 
likely in the context of knowledge work, where the difficulty of observing behaviors and the 
controller’s lower knowledge of the transformation process make any control efforts more likely 
to be based on imperfect measurement systems. Because of the imperfect measurement systems 
on which the formal control efforts are based, the control mechanisms are limited in their ability 
to encourage effort toward task. In addition, the imperfect measurement systems provide 
individual employees more latitude to allocate effort toward non task-related pursuits or toward 
 26 
perfunctory or even subversive behaviors. Since effort is not an unlimited resource, more latitude 
to engage in non-task-related behaviors or dysfunctional behaviors can be expected to decrease 
the amount of effort given to task. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H6: The more difficult the controlee believes it is for the controller to observe behaviors, the 
weaker the positive effect of behavior control on individual effort toward task 
H7: The more difficult the controlee believes it is for the controller to measure outcomes, the 
weaker the positive effect of outcome control on individual effort toward task 
3.1.4 Control variables for individual-level model 
In addition to the main study variables, task difficulty and project complexity are included as 
control variables. Task difficulty is expected to affect individual effort toward task, and project 
complexity is expected to affect individual coordination success. 
 
3.2 TEAM-LEVEL RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The team-level research model is presented in Figure 2 on the following page. The model is 
explained in more detail in the sections that follow, and specific hypotheses are developed. 
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Figure 2: Team-level Research Model 
3.2.1 Control modes and IS development performance outcomes 
The objective of control systems is improved performance. However, systems development 
performance is a multidimensional concept, including dimensions such as adherence to schedules 
and budgets, quality of the system produced, knowledge gained during the project, and whether 
or not the system is being used and providing value to the business. Moreover, different 
stakeholders often hold varying views of the success of an information systems development 
project (Nelson 2005). This wide range of performance outcomes reflects everything about the 
project, from conception and evaluating the business case for the project, through development, 
to implementation and subsequent use. However, some of the decisions that determine these 
outcomes are made outside of the scope of the immediate project team and their manager. For 
example, whether or not a project provides value to a business is determined not only by the 
effectiveness of the development process and the quality of the system produced, which are 
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under the scope of the project manager and project team, but also by the quality of the business 
case made for the project, the care with which that business case was evaluated, and the 
implementation strategy, all of which may be beyond the scope of the project manager and 
project team. Because this study examines specifically the effects of control efforts on project 
performance, we will only consider dimensions of performance that directly result from how the 
project was controlled and executed by the project manager and project team. Two such 
dimensions were identified by Nidumolu (1995) in a study of IT projects: product performance 
and process performance. Product performance includes such factors as ease of use, quality, and 
customer satisfaction with the product produced or enhanced by the project. Process performance 
refers to how well the project made use of its resources, such as time, human resources, and 
financial resources. Typical process performance indicators include adherence to schedule, work 
hour, and budget estimates. In this study both of these dimensions of project performance will be 
considered. The effects of control on both product performance and resource overruns will be 
examined. 
3.2.2 Relationship of  control modes to team effort toward task and team coordination 
success 
The next five hypotheses are parallel to H1 through H5 in the individual-level model. The only 
difference is that in the team-level model effort toward task and coordination success are 
conceptualized and measured at the team level of analysis. The reasoning behind these 
hypotheses is the same as that for H1 through H5 in the individual-level model, presented in 
section 3.1. 
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H8: Behavior control will have a positive relationship with team effort toward task 
H9: Outcome control will have a positive relationship with team effort toward task 
H10: Clan control will have a positive relationship with team effort toward task 
H11: Behavior control will have a positive relationship with team coordination success 
H12: Clan control will have a positive relationship with team coordination success 
3.2.3 Team effort toward task and project performance outcomes 
Team effort toward task, in turn, is expected to improve performance. The direct link between 
effort and work performance has been suggested by several management studies, most of which 
have examined the effects of various personal characteristics on effort, and subsequently on 
performance. For example, Brown and Peterson (1994) investigated the effects of 
competitiveness, instrumentality, role conflict, and role ambiguity on sales performance and job 
satisfaction. They found that instrumentality and role conflict affected performance only through 
effort, which had a positive and statistically significant relationship to performance. Similarly, 
Ingram et al. (1989) investigated the relationship of various types of commitment and motivation 
to sales performance. Extrinsic motivation and job commitment were found to have effects on 
sales performance that were mediated by effort, which had a positive and statistically significant 
relationship to sales performance. Outside of the sales context, Blau (1993) found a direct effort 
to performance relationship with a sample of 258 bank tellers, and Terborg and Miller (1978) 
tested 60 subjects with an experimental construction task, finding that effort had a direct effect 
on performance.  
These studies suggest a direct relationship between individual effort toward task and 
individual performance. In the information systems development context most typical measures 
of performance are at the team or project level. Even though team performance may not be a 
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simple additive function of individual team member effort toward task, it can still be reasonably 
expected to be a function of team effort toward task. Therefore, team effort toward task can be 
expected to have a positive effect on project performance, which leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H13: Team effort toward task will have a positive relationship with performance, mediating 
the effects of behavior control, outcome control, and clan control on performance  
3.2.4 Team coordination success and project performance outcomes 
Coordination success is also expected to improve project performance. Kraut and Streeter (1995) 
performed a survey study of the use of formal and informal coordination mechanisms in software 
development. Their definition of coordination was multifaceted. It included sharing information, 
coordinating activities, and developing a shared understanding. They found that formal 
mechanisms of coordination are positively associated with managerial assessments of project 
performance, while informal mechanisms of coordination were more closely associated with 
team member and user assessments of project outcomes. 
Nidumolu (1995) studied the effects of administrative coordination and informal 
coordination on software development performance. Although there is not an exact 
correspondence between Nidumolu’s categories and those of Kraut and Streeter, the results are 
similar. Administrative or formal coordination methods were found to be associated with project 
performance through the intervening mechanism of residual project risk, or the uncertainty about 
project outcomes that remains late in the project. More informal coordination modes, Nidumolu 
found, led to improved project performance as well, but did not work through reduction of 
residual project risk. 
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Faraj and Sproull (2000) examined expertise coordination in software development. They 
defined expertise as specialized knowledge and skills and expertise coordination as knowing the 
location of expertise, knowing where it is needed, and bringing it to bear. Expertise coordination, 
their study demonstrated, has a positive effect on project performance above and beyond the 
effect of simply having expertise present on the team. 
Finally, Tiwana and McLean (2005) examined expertise integration and its effect on team 
creativity in software development. In findings similar to those of Faraj and Sproull (2000), 
Tiwana and McLean demonstrated that other project factors thought to lead to project success, 
such as absorptive capacity, relational capital, and expertise heterogeneity, do so only through 
the mediating factor of expertise integration.  
These studies suggest that improvements in coordination have a positive effect on 
information systems development project performance. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H14: Team Coordination success will have a positive relationship with performance, 
mediating the effects of behavior control and clan control on performance 
3.2.5 Control variables for team-level model 
In addition to the study variables, project size and project complexity are included as control 
variables, since in prior research studies these variables have been associated with IS 
development project performance. 
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4.0  METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the details of the research design used to test the individual-level and team-
level research models. The main topics addressed in this chapter include the design of the field 
survey, operationalization of the research constructs, description of the pre-test and pilot tests, 
and a description of the data collection process. 
4.1 RESEARCH  DESIGN 
The research models were tested empirically with a field survey. Questionnaires were solicited 
from the project manager and team members who took part in recently-completed IS 
development projects in business and academic organizations. Separate questionnaires were 
developed for each group of respondents so that each responded to items that they were most 
qualified to provide responses to, and also to reduce the potential for common source bias. 
Project managers, defined as the individuals with the role of controlling and overseeing 
the work of the project team members, responded to items measuring the formal control modes, 
performance outcomes, and project complexity. In addition, demographic variables related to the 
project, such as project size and budget, were assessed from the project manager questionnaires. 
The project manager is an appropriate choice to respond to these items because, as the controller, 
the project manager is the implementer and potentially the designer of the formal control 
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structures, and should be familiar with them. In addition, since the objective of the study is to 
explore the performance effects of control modes, which are typically implemented by 
management, it is appropriate to measure them from management’s perspective. In addition, the 
project manager also may be expected to have a clearer picture of the project’s time and budget 
goals, as well as its performance relative to those goals.  
Project team members, including developers and analysts, responded to items measuring 
clan control, difficulty of measuring outcomes, difficulty of observing behaviors, effort toward 
task, and coordination success at the individual and team levels. Since it is the controlee’s 
perceptions of the difficulty of observing behaviors and measuring outcomes that are 
hypothesized to moderate the relationships between the formal control modes and effort toward 
task, it is appropriate to measure the manager’s difficulty of observing behaviors and measuring 
outcomes from the controlee’s perspective. In addition, only the controlees are qualified to give 
an accurate assessment of their effort toward task, and the degree to which their work was 
coordinated with that of other team members. 
4.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF RESEARCH CONSTRUCTS 
The following sections describe the sources of the measurement items chosen to measure the 
study constructs. In cases where new items were developed for this research, the concepts 
underlying the development of the items are presented. 
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4.2.1 Measures for behavior, outcome, and clan control 
The measures for the formal control modes, behavior and outcome control, are new items 
adapted from Kirsch (1996) and Kirsch et al. (2002). Table 1 presents the measurement items for 
behavior control. The measurement items for outcome control are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 1: Measurement Items for Behavior Control 
To what extent did you use the following strategies when evaluating the performance of project 
team members? 
BC1 
When assessing project team member performance, I placed significant weight on 
project-related behaviors 
BC2 I held project team members accountable for how they behaved during the project 
BC3 
I expected project team members to follow an understandable, written sequence of steps 
to accomplish project goals 
BC4 
I assessed the extent to which existing, written procedures and practices were followed 
during the development process 
BC5 I strictly enforced adherence to written rules and procedures 
 
 
Table 2: Measurement Items for Outcome Control 
To what extent did you use the following strategies when evaluating the performance of project 
team members? 
OC1 
I used pre-established targets as benchmarks for performance evaluations of project 
team members 
OC2 I placed significant weight upon timely project completion 
OC3 I placed significant weight upon project completion within budget 
OC4 I placed significant weight upon project completion to the satisfaction of the client 
OC5 
I evaluated performance by the extent to which project goals were accomplished, 
regardless of how the goals were accomplished 
OC6 Project team member rewards were linked to results 
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The measure for the informal control mode, clan control, is adapted from Kirsch et al. 
(forthcoming). The items for the clan control measure are presented in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Measurement Items for Clan Control 
To what extent do the following statements accurately describe your relationship with the project 
team?  
CC1 
Shared norms and values among the project team members influenced their project-
related behaviors 
CC2 
A common vision of the project influenced how the project team members behaved 
during the project 
CC3 All project team members attempted to be “regular” members of the project team 
 
4.2.2 Measures of difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes 
Difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes are closely related 
theoretically to behavior observability and outcome measurability, for which there are existing 
measures in the literature. However, in this study difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty 
of measuring outcomes are meant to reflect the project team members’ perceptions of how well 
the project manager can observe and evaluate their behavior and outcomes of their work, and the 
existing measures focus more on actions taken by controllers to observe behavior or observe 
outcomes. Because of this, new measures were developed for these constructs. The items for 
difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes reflect the project team 
members’ perceptions of the manager’s ability to observe their work behavior and measure their 
work outcomes. The items for difficulty of observing behaviors are shown in Table 4, and the 
items for difficulty of observing outcomes are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 4: Measurement Items for Difficulty of Observing Behaviors 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
DOB1 
My manager could not tell how well I was contributing to the project simply by 
observing my actions 
DOB2 
It was easy for my manager to determine whether or not I was doing what I was 
supposed to be doing by observing my behavior 
DOB3 
It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I was slacking off or working very 
hard on the project 
DOB4 My behaviors on the project were difficult for my manager to evaluate 
 
 
Table 5: Measurement Items for Difficulty of Measuring Outcomes 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
DMO1 
It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I achieved specified outcome 
targets 
DMO2 
It was difficult for my manager to measure the specific performance outcomes of my 
work on the project 
DMO3 The outcomes of the work I did on the project were easy for my manager to specify 
DMO4 The outcomes of my work on the project were difficult for my manager to evaluate 
4.2.3 Measures of effort toward task 
The measurement items used in this research to measure effort will be adapted from the intensity 
dimension of Brown and Leigh’s (1996) effort measure. Brown and Leigh also included a time 
commitment dimension in their effort measure, and the target of the effort is reflected in the 
wording of the items that measure intensity of effort. Brown and Leigh’s duration of effort 
dimension will not be used here because it measures mainly the hours at the office and 
emphasizes the perspectives of clients and peers. Then number of hours spent at the office does 
not necessarily reflect effort toward task, and such a measure might also reflect effectiveness at 
impression management rather than actual hours of work. For this study, the intensity dimension 
of Brown and Leigh’s measure was adapted so that it refers to the project as the target of effort. 
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The adapted items are shown below in Table 6 (individual effort toward task) and Table 7 (team 
effort toward task). As a result of the pilot tests, these measures were further revised before the 
main data collection effort. The revised measures are presented in Table 13 (individual effort 
toward task) and Table 14 (individual effort toward task) on page 46. 
Table 6: Measurement Items for Effort Toward Task (Individual Level) 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements in relation to the specific project 
you are reporting on in this survey. If you were not assigned to the project full-time, answer with 
respect to the portion of your time when you were assigned to be working on the project 
IEFF1 
When there was a project-related task to be completed, I devoted all my energy to 
getting it done 
IEFF2 I worked on my project-related tasks with intensity 
IEFF3 I worked at my full capacity in all of my job duties related to the project 
IEFF4 I strived as hard as I could to be successful in my work on the project 
IEFF5 I really exerted myself working on the project 
 
Table 7: Measurement Items for Effort Toward Task (Team Level) 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements in relation to the team as a whole, 
and its work on the specific project you are reporting on in this survey. 
TEFF1 
When there were project-related tasks to be completed, the team devoted all its energy 
to getting them done 
TEFF2 The team worked on their project-related tasks with intensity 
TEFF3 The team worked at its full capacity in all of its job duties related to the project 
TEFF4 The team strived as hard as it could to be successful in its work on the project 
TEFF5 The team really exerted itself working on this project 
4.2.4 Measures of coordination success 
Malone and Crowston (1994) define coordination as the management of dependencies between 
tasks, and they classify the dependencies into several types, including shared resource 
dependencies, producer/consumer dependencies, simultaneity constraints, and task/subtask 
dependencies. In addition, since information systems development is knowledge work, many of 
the dependencies between subtasks are knowledge or expertise dependencies. Faraj and Sproull 
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(2000) demonstrate that expertise coordination is very important to software development project 
success. They define expertise coordination as “knowing where expertise is located, recognizing 
where it is needed, and bringing it to bear” (p. 1556). In developing a measure of coordination 
success, each of these types of constraints should be considered and reflected in the measure. As 
noted by Malone and Crowston (1994, p. 90) “Good coordination is nearly invisible, and we 
sometimes notice coordination most clearly when it is lacking.” Thus, a measure of coordination 
success can measure both the presence of indicators of good coordination and the absence of 
indicators of poor coordination. Table 8 below shows the items developed for measuring 
coordination success at the individual level, and Table 9 shows the items developed for 
measuring coordination success at the team level. 
 
Table 8: Measurement Items for Coordination Success (Individual Level) 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements in relation to the specific project 
you are reporting on in this survey. 
ICS1 Resources I needed to do my work on the project were available when I needed them 
ICS2 
When I was dependent on other team members to finish something before I could begin 
my work they finished on time 
ICS3 It was easy to integrate my work with that of other team members 
ICS4 
I understood what parts of the task I was responsible for and how those parts of the task 
related to the parts that were the responsibility of other team members 
ICS5 
When I needed to access the specialized knowledge or expertise of other team members, 
I was able to do so 
ICS6 
I often was left with nothing to do because I had to wait for other team members to 
finish their work 
ICS7 Overall, my work was successfully coordinated with that of other team members 
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Table 9: Measurement Items for Coordination Success (Team Level) 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements in relation to the specific 
project you are reporting on in this survey. Your answers should reflect your assessment of the 
project team as a whole. 
TCS1 
Resources team members needed to do their work on the project were available when 
they needed them 
TCS2 
When team members were dependent on other team members to finish something before 
they could begin their work the other team members finished on time 
TCS3 It was easy for team members to integrate their work with that of other team members 
TCS4 
Team members understood what parts of the task they were responsible for and how 
those parts of the task related to the parts that were the responsibility of other team 
members 
TCS5 
When team members needed to access the specialized knowledge or expertise of other 
team members, they were able to do so 
TCS6 
Team members were often left with nothing to do because they had to wait for other 
team members to finish their work 
TCS7 
Overall, the work of each team member was successfully coordinated with the work of 
the other team members 
 
4.2.5  Performance measures 
Both objective and perceptional performance measures were utilized, and performance was 
assessed from the perspective of both the project managers and the team members. Items adapted 
from Nidumolu (1995) to measure resource overruns are shown in Table 10 on the following 
page. 
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Table 10: Measurement Items for Resource Overruns 
RESOV1 
By approximately what percentage, if any, did actual costs for the project overrun 
originally budgeted costs? (Indicate underrun by a negative sign. For example, enter 
20% if the project was 20% over budget, or -10% if the project was 10% under 
budget)  
RESOV2 
By approximately what percentage, if any, did actual completion time for the project 
overrun originally budgeted completion time? (Indicate underrun by a negative sign. 
For example, enter 30% if the project was 30% over time, or -10% if the project 
finished 10% earlier than expected) 
RESOV3 
By approximately what percentage, if any, did actual systems and programming 
effort for the project overrun originally budgeted effort? (Indicate underrun by a 
negative sign. For example, enter 10% if the project used 10% more person days than 
expected, or -10% if the project used 10% less than expected) 
 
An additional measure of project performance is the product performance construct from 
Ravichandran and Rai (1999). While the resource overruns measure focuses on the performance 
of the project against its budget, schedule, and resource use goals, the product performance 
measure is included to reflect the success of the information system developed or enhanced by 
the project in meeting the needs of its users. The items measuring product performance are 
presented in Table 11 below. 
Table 11: Measurement Items for Product Performance 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements in relation to the specific project 
you are reporting on in this survey. 
PRODP1 Users perceive that the project deliverable meets intended functional requirements 
PRODP2 The information provided by the project deliverable meets user expectations 
PRODP3 The project deliverable meets user expectations with respect to ease of use 
PRODP4 Users are satisfied with the overall quality of the project deliverable 
 
4.2.6 Measures of key control variables 
Key control variables for the study include project size and complexity, as  these variables have 
been demonstrated in prior research to be related to IS project performance. Project size was 
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measured with an item that asks project managers to indicate the number of team members who 
worked on the project. Other potential measures of project size, such as project budget and 
duration, are also included on the survey questionnaire. 
Complexity of the IS development project was measured with items from Xia and Lee 
(2005). These items, shown in Table 12 below were developed to measure structural 
organizational complexity and structural IT complexity. 
Table 12: Measurement Items for Project Complexity 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements in relation to the specific project 
and system you are reporting on in this survey. 
ISDPC1 The project team was cross-functional 
ISDPC2 The project involved multiple external contractors and vendors 
ISDPC3 The project involved coordinating multiple user units 
ISDPC4 The system involved real-time data processing 
ISDPC5 The project involved multiple software environments 
ISDPC6 The project involved multiple technology platforms 
ISDPC7 The project involved a lot of integration with other systems 
 
4.3 PRE-TEST AND PILOT STUDIES 
A pre-test and two small pilot studies were conducted prior to the main data collection to further 
refine the measurement items and data collection procedures. 
4.3.1 Pre-test 
A pre-test of the proposed measurement items was conducted to test whether the measurement 
items were clear to respondents, and whether they reflected the conceptual definitions of the 
constructs they were intended to measure. 
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To conduct the pre-test, first a document listing the proposed items and their sources was 
distributed to four IS researchers and one marketing researcher familiar with the study, and they 
were asked to review the items for clarity and face validity. Based on their feedback, several 
small changes to the wording of some items were made. Following these changes the survey was 
implemented online using the Qualtrics survey software, and the original reviewers, along with 
two IS doctoral students, were asked to review the items again. Feedback from this second 
review indicated that no further changes were needed to the measurement items. 
4.3.2 First pilot study 
Following the pre-testing of the survey items and online instrument, a pilot study was conducted 
to test the data collection strategy. For the pilot study, several people who manage IS 
development projects were contacted and asked to complete the survey for a specific project and 
then forward the survey URL to the team members who had worked for them on the project. As 
an incentive for the pilot study, the IS managers were informed that all respondents who were 
part of a complete project set (includes completed surveys from a person in a managerial role and 
multiple team members who they supervised on that project) would be included in a drawing for 
ten $25 gift certificates. 
Despite the incentives, it was very difficult to collect data for the pilot study. Twelve 
individuals who manage IS projects were contacted and asked to participate in the pilot by 
responding to the survey for one or more of the projects that they manage. In total, only 8 
completed responses were received. They were associated with 4 different projects in 3 different 
organizations. There were 3 responses from project managers and 5 responses from team 
members. 
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Several factors contributed to the difficulty of gathering pilot data. First, the survey 
design places the burden of effort on the person who manages the IS project, because that person 
must fill out the survey for a project, and then also identify the team members involved in the 
project, forward the survey URL to them, and ask them to complete the survey. So, not only does  
the manager have to  spend his  or her time responding to the survey,  he or  she also must ask 
others to spend time  doing so. Second, the current economic recession has led to layoffs in many 
business organizations,  and the employees who remain are reluctant to participate in a  survey.  
Finally, the survey took longer to fill out than anticipated, contributing to the number of 
respondents who started the survey but did not finish it. Project Managers needed on average 17 
min. 41 seconds to complete the survey (ranging from 15:28 – 21:22). Team members took an 
average of  16 min. 10 seconds to complete the survey (ranging from 7:17 to 29:55).  
Because of the difficulty of acquiring pilot data, changes were made to the data collection 
procedure for the main study. The first change was to make the survey instrument shorter by 
removing some redundant measures and simplifying the measure for ISDP functional 
complexity, a control variable, by including only two of its dimensions. In the pilot test there 
were two types of redundancy in the measures. First, some constructs were measured from both 
the project managers and the team members. The number of these was reduced. Second, some of 
the performance measures overlapped with each other. In these cases one measure was chosen. 
The effect of these changes was to reduce the project manager survey from 75 items to 50 items, 
and the team member survey from 76 items to 57 items. 
The second change to the data collection procedure was to increase the incentive 
drawings and to provide a small incentive payment of a $10 gift certificate to the project 
managers of each completed project set. It  was hoped that  this additional incentive for the 
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project managers would help to  overcome the burden caused by their dual role of having to fill 
out the survey and also ask the team members who worked  for them on the project to do so. 
The third change to the data collection procedure was to make an attempt to contact large 
groups of individuals who manage IS development projects by distributing information about the 
study to groups such as the Project Management Institute’s IS Special Interest Group (PMI-
ISSIG), the Association of Information Technology Professionals, and several local PMI 
chapters. 
Because the pilot study yielded so little data it was not practical to perform statistical 
tests of the measurement model or to do any hypothesis testing. However, examination of the 
responses to the survey items indicated potential problems with the measures for individual 
effort toward task and team effort toward task. Of the 5 team member responses received in the 
pilot, 4 of the 5 respondents indicated 7 (“strongly agree”) for all of the individual and team-
level effort toward task items. The other respondent had some variability in the individual 
measure (two 7s, one 6, two 5s), but indicated 6 for every team-level effort toward task item. 
It is likely that these skewed  responses to the items measuring effort toward task were 
caused by social desirability bias, since the items ask the respondent how hard he or she worked 
on project tasks. Respondents may exaggerate the level of their effort in order to give a response 
that they feel is socially desirable. Moreover, this effect may have been magnified in the pilot by 
the nature of the sample. The researcher knows many of the pilot study respondents personally, 
so the respondents could have been conscious of the fact that even though the survey is 
anonymous, at least one person they knew would be able to see their responses. The respondent 
with some variability in his responses to the items was someone who the researcher does not 
know personally. This lack of variability in the effort toward task measures suggested that the 
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data collection procedure be changed to encourage the respondents to be honest in their 
responses, and to give respondents a greater sense of trust that their responses are truly 
anonymous. Changes were made to the survey items and instructions to attempt to do so. 
The lack of variability in the effort toward task measures may also have been caused by 
properties of the items themselves. The items are stated in the positive, and they ask respondents 
to agree or disagree with the statement. This could have biased the responses to be higher than 
they should have been. To address this problem, the measures were revised to  ask respondents to 
rate their level of effort, rather than agreeing or disagreeing to statements stated in the positive. 
In addition, respondents were asked to rate their level of effort not absolutely, but relative to their 
level of effort on other projects on which they had worked in a professional setting. Table 13 
(individual level) and Table 14 (team level) below show the new, revised effort toward task 
measures. Both of these measures use a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very low to very high. 
Table 13: Revised Items for Individual Effort toward Task 
Please rate the following for the specific project you are reporting on in this survey compared to 
other projects you have worked on in professional settings.  Please answer honestly. Your 
responses are strictly confidential: 
IEFF1 Amount of energy I expended toward project-related tasks 
IEFF2 The intensity of my effort on project-related tasks 
IEFF3 My effort toward making the project a success 
IEFF4 My total level of exertion on the project 
 
Table 14: Revised Items for Team Effort toward Task 
Please rate the following in relation to the team as a whole, and its work on the specific project 
you are reporting on in this survey. Please answer honestly. Your responses are strictly 
confidential: 
TEFF1 Amount of energy the team expended toward project-related tasks 
TEFF2 The intensity of the team’s effort on project-related tasks 
TEFF3 The team’s effort toward making the project a success 
TEFF4 The team’s total level of exertion on the project 
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During the pilot study the researcher also became aware of the need for a new control 
variable that measured respondents’ perceptions of the difficulty of the task. This control was 
included to account for variability in effort toward  task caused by the difficulty of the task for a 
particular respondent. It is a one-item measure that asks respondents: “How difficult for you 
were the project tasks you were assigned?”, and asks them to respond on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from “very easy” to “very difficult”. 
Because of the revision of the instructions and items for the effort toward task measures, 
a second pilot study was conducted to test these measures. 
4.3.3 Second pilot study 
For the second pilot study, an online survey was created with the new effort toward task 
measures the new single-item task difficulty measure, and the measures for difficulty of 
observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes, since those measures were new 
measures developed for this research and required further testing. Students in the Introduction to 
MIS course at University of Pittsburgh were asked to take the survey, reporting on a particular 
project that they had been involved with either at work, at an internship, or, if they had no work 
experience, a class project. The questionnaire was completed by 26 students. 
Descriptive statistics for the measures indicate that the new effort toward task measures 
exhibit greater variability than the old measures. The descriptive statistics for the constructs 
included in the second pilot study are shown on Table 15 on the following page. 
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Constructs in Second Pilot 
Construct Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Difficulty of 
Observing Behaviors  
4.06 1.59 1.75 7.00 
Difficulty of 
Measuring Outcomes 
3.59 1.44 0.25 6.25 
Individual Effort 
toward Task 
5.57 .80 3.75 7.00 
Team Effort toward 
Task 
5.03 1.03 1.00 7.00 
 
Reliability of the new measures was also assessed by calculating Cronbach’s alpha for 
each construct. As shown below in Table 16, the Cronbach’s alpha values suggest that the new 
measures are reliable. 
Table 16: Cronbach’s Alpha for Constructs in Second Pilot 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha 
Difficulty of Observing Behaviors (DOB) .87 
Difficulty of Measuring Outcomes (DMO) .84 
Individual Effort toward Task (IE) .93 
Team Effort toward Task (TE) .95 
 
Finally, a factor analysis was conducted to test whether or not the new measures exhibit 
convergent and discriminant validity. The factor analysis was conducted using principle 
component analysis as the extraction method and varimax rotation. The number of factors was 
not specified beforehand. Four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 emerged, explaining 
82.06% of the variability in the items. Although there is some significant cross loading with item 
DOB4, all the items loaded most highly on the construct which they were intended to measure. 
This factor analysis suggests that the new measures exhibit adequate convergent and 
discriminant validity. The results of the factor analysis are displayed in Table 17 below.  
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Table 17: Factor Analysis for Constructs in Second Pilot 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
IE1 .138 .936 .108 -.010 
IE2 -.061 .918 -.098 .032 
IE3 -.020 .896 -.085 .113 
IE4 .026 .906 .044 .072 
TE1 .923 .011 -.062 -.075 
TE2 .932 .146 -.070 .188 
TE3 .915 -.052 -.020 .069 
TE4 .938 -.009 -.119 .052 
DOB1 -.210 -.062 .869 .075 
DOB2 -.177 -.101 .880 .087 
DOB3 .010 .166 .820 .375 
DOB4 .358 -.053 .609 .512 
DMO1 -.152 .168 .079 .841 
DMO2 -.021 .099 .438 .733 
DMO3 .259 .073 .402 .799 
DMO4 .136 -.053 -.002 .740 
 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
4.4.1 Data collection procedures 
The survey was implemented online via the Qualtrics survey software. There was one online 
questionnaire that branched to different sets of items based on whether the respondent was a 
manager or a team member. For the main data collection effort individuals likely to have a  
managerial or supervisory role related to IS development projects were contacted and provided 
with information about the study and a link to a web page with information on the study, as well 
as a direct link to the online survey itself. They were asked to fill out the survey for a particular 
project completed during the last two years, and then to forward the study URL to the team 
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members who worked for them on the project and ask them to fill out the survey for that project. 
Managers were also asked to instruct team members to use the same names they used for the 
project and organization in order to facilitate matching of the responses. 
To encourage participation, three different types of incentives were provided to 
respondents. First, a summary of study results was promised to participants upon request. 
Second, project managers of completed project sets, including the manager survey and surveys 
from multiple team members, were awarded a $10 Amazon.com gift certificate via email. 
Finally, all respondents who were part of completed project sets were entered into multiple 
drawings for prizes. In the first two drawings, multiple Amazon.com gift certificates in $50, $25, 
and $10 denominations were awarded. In the final drawing, which has not yet been completed, 
fifteen $100 Visa cards will be awarded. 
Early in the data collection process several potential respondents expressed concern that 
participating in the survey would cause them to have to share confidential data. To alleviate this 
concern, on the study information web page and in email communications, potential participants 
were instructed that they could use fictional names for their project and organization, as long as 
all respondents for a particular project or organization used the same fictional names. 
Study respondents were reached through several different approaches. The researcher 
contacted IS managers in three different organizations in which he had worked as a developer 
and asked them to participate in the survey. He also asked several other personal contacts known 
to have a supervisory or managerial role related to IS development projects to participate. These 
contacts were, in turn, asked to share information about the study with their own contacts who 
had a supervisory or managerial role related to IS development projects.  
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In addition to personal contacts, efforts were made to ask for participation from members 
of the Project Management Institute (PMI), the PMI Information Systems Special Interest Group 
(PMI-ISSIG), and the Pittsburgh chapter of the Association of Information Technology 
Professionals (AITP-Pittsburgh). The researcher attended several PMI meetings, and also gained 
permission to send an email describing the study to the members of PMI-ISSIG, the members of 
AITP-Pittsburgh, the members of the Pittsburgh PMI chapter, and the members of the Northeast 
Ohio PMI chapter. 
During the data collection effort, emails were sent periodically to manager respondents to 
let them know how many team members had responded for their project, to encourage them to 
ask the team members to respond if they had not responded yet, and to encourage them to fill out 
the survey for  a second project. 
4.4.2 Description of final sample 
In the final sample used for the dissertation analysis 84 completed surveys were received from 
managers. Of these, 37 were matched with one or more corresponding surveys received from 
team members. In total, 87 completed surveys were received from team members, with 73 of 
them matched to a corresponding manager survey. A project dataset was considered to be 
complete if at least one complete manager survey and one complete team member survey was 
received for that project. In total, there were 37 projects for which both a complete manager 
survey and one or more complete team member surveys were received. The following summary 
statistics refer to these 37 complete project datasets. 
The average time since project completion was 6 months. The average number of team 
member responses per project was 2.03. Managers were asked to report the total number of team 
 51 
members involved with the project. The completed projects ranged from 2 to 250 team members 
(avg 17.86; stdev 40.37). Managers were also asked to report the total number of team members 
they personally had responsibility for managing on the project. This measure ranged from 2 – 
150 team members (avg 10.89; stdev 24.60). From the sampling procedure it is impossible to 
determine whether the teams in the sample are co-located or distributed teams. However, effects 
of team proximity are likely to be captured in the individual study model by the variables 
difficulty of measuring outcomes and difficulty of observing behaviors. 
4.4.3 Assessment of non-response bias 
Because the survey questionnaires were distributed electronically to several different 
organizations and professional groups, as well as by word-of-mouth, it is impossible to calculate 
an accurate response rate. However, it is still appropriate to perform diagnostic tests to determine 
the likelihood of non-response bias. In order to test for non-response bias in the study dataset, t-
tests were conducted to compare construct scores for all study variables between early 
responders and late responders. The bulk of the survey responses were received between mid-
March and mid-April 2009. Emailed reminders resulted in a few more surveys trickling in 
between April 29, 2009 and May 18, 2009. Accordingly, early responders were defined as those 
who completed the survey before April 29, 2009. Surveys received on April 29,2009 and after 
were defined as late responders.  The only variable for which significant differences were found 
in the construct scores between early and late responders was clan control. Early responders 
averaged 4.95 and late responders averaged 5.69. The difference was statistically significant (p = 
.039). There were no significant differences between early and late responders on any of the 
other study variables. 
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In addition, t-tests were also conducted to compare the demographic variables age, 
gender, and number of years in IS between early responders and late responders. There were no 
significant differences in these variables. Because only one study variable showed a significant 
difference between early and late respondents, these assessments suggest that the conclusions of 
this study are not likely to be significantly affected by non-response bias. 
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5.0  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 VALIDATION OF MEASURES 
For  each of the measures convergent and discriminant validity were tested using exploratory 
factor analyses, and reliability was tested by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. All completed survey 
responses were used in the validation of the measurement model. Factor analyses were 
conducted using principle components extraction with varimax rotation. In the first stage of each 
factor analysis the number of factors was not specified, to see how many factors with 
eigenvalues over 1.0 emerged. 
Because of the relatively small sample size, and because different constructs were 
measured from different respondents, several separate factor analyses were conducted. In 
general, the factor analyses are grouped such that independent variables measured from the 
project managers are included together in one factor analysis, and independent variables 
measured from the team members are included together in a factor analysis. Similarly, dependent 
variables measured from the project managers and dependent variables measured from the team 
members are grouped together. There were some minor adjustments made to this strategy to 
attempt to ensure that the ratio of respondents to items for each factor analysis was at least 5, 
which has been suggested as the minimum ratio necessary for reliable factor analysis. 
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5.1.1 Behavior control and outcome control 
All the items measuring behavior control and outcome control were included together in a factor 
analysis. As shown in Table 18 on the following page, four factors emerged with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.0. These factors together explained 66.64% of the variance in the items. 
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 Table 18: Factor Analysis for Behavior Control and Outcome Control 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
OC1 I used pre-established targets as 
benchmarks for performance 
evaluations of project team 
members 
.379 .591 -.034 -.165 
OC2 I placed significant weight upon 
timely project completion 
-.078 .553 .030 .476 
OC3 I placed significant weight upon 
project completion within budget 
.178 -.001 .037 .890 
OC4 I placed significant weight upon 
project completion to the 
satisfaction of the client 
.246 .061 .642 .160 
OC5 I evaluated performance by the 
extent to which project goals were 
accomplished, regardless of how 
the goals were accomplished 
-.150 -.070 .820 -.082 
OC6 Project team member rewards were 
linked to results 
-.073 .751 -.159 .116 
BC1 When assessing project team 
member performance, I placed 
significant weight on project-related 
behaviors 
.245 .693 .348 -.019 
BC2 I held project team members 
accountable for how they behaved 
during the project 
.567 .373 .364 -.077 
BC3 I expected project team members to 
follow an understandable, written 
sequence of steps to accomplish 
project goals 
.872 .057 .073 .047 
BC4 I assessed the extent to which 
existing, written procedures and 
practices were followed during the 
development process 
.891 .078 -.075 .125 
BC5 I strictly enforced adherence to 
written rules and procedures 
.872 .036 .075 .087 
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The outcome control items do not load cleanly onto one factor, but based on the items 
that load on it, Factor 2 seems to represent best the conceptual definition of outcome control. 
OC1 contains the ideas of pre-established targets being used as benchmarks for performance 
evaluations, and OC6 reflects team member rewards being linked to results. These are both key 
concepts of outcome control. OC2 reflects that significant weight is put on timely project 
completion. Item BC1, although originally intended to measure behavior control, loads most 
strongly on factor 2. This is likely because it contains a strong sense of evaluating performance, 
which to respondents may be associated with the end of a project, and “performance” is likely to 
be interpreted as outcomes by respondents.  
The behavior control items load cleanly onto one factor, with the exception of BC1. This 
factor contains the ideas of holding team members accountable for their behavior, and of 
enforcing adherence to written policies and procedures. These concepts are reflective of behavior 
control.  
Items OC3 through OC5 were dropped because they did not load onto the factors that 
were identified as measuring behavior control or outcome control. After dropping these items a 
second factor analysis was performed for the remaining behavior and outcome control items, 
specifying two factors. The results of the second factor analysis are shown below in Table 19. In 
this factor analysis, 60.21% of the variance in the items was explained by the two specified 
factors, and each item loads cleanly on one factor. With item BC1 included in the scale for 
outcome control Cronbach’s alpha for behavior control is .85 and for outcome control 
Cronbach’s alpha is .60. 
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Table 19: Factor Analysis for Behavior and Outcome Control after Dropping Items 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 
OC1 I used pre-established targets as benchmarks for 
performance evaluations of project team members 
.397 .524 
OC2 I placed significant weight upon timely project 
completion 
-.034 .637 
OC6 
Project team member rewards were linked to results 
-.080 .731 
BC1 When assessing project team member performance, I 
placed significant weight on project-related behaviors 
.314 .707 
BC2 I held project team members accountable for how they 
behaved during the project 
.623 .368 
BC3 I expected project team members to follow an 
understandable, written sequence of steps to accomplish 
project goals 
.877 .027 
BC4 I assessed the extent to which existing, written 
procedures and practices were followed during the 
development process 
.882 .045 
BC5 I strictly enforced adherence to written rules and 
procedures 
.875 .012 
5.1.2 IS development project complexity 
The items used to measure IS development project complexity were entered into a factor 
analysis. One factor emerged that explained 50.28% of the variance in the items. Results of the 
factor analysis are shown in Table 20 on the next page. 
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Table 20: Factor Analysis for Project Complexity 
Item Item Text Factor 1 
ISDPC1 
The project team was cross-functional 
.599 
ISDPC2 The project involved multiple external contractors 
and vendors 
.603 
ISDPC3 
The project involved coordinating multiple user units 
.710 
ISDPC4 
The system involved real-time data processing 
.536 
ISDPC5 
The project involved multiple software environments 
.830 
ISDPC6 
The project involved multiple technology platforms 
.835 
ISDPC7 The project involved a lot of integration with other 
systems 
.787 
 
All items loaded strongly on the one factor that emerged from the factor analysis, so all 
items were retained in the measure. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is .82. 
5.1.3 Difficulty of observing behavior, difficulty of measuring outcomes, and clan control  
The original factor analysis for difficulty of observing behaviors (DOB), difficulty of measuring 
outcomes (DMO) and clan control is shown in the Table 21 on the following page. With all items 
included, two factors emerged, explaining 64.79% of the variance in the items. 
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 Table 21:  Factor Analysis for DOB, DMO, and Clan Control 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 
DOB1 My manager could not tell how well I was contributing 
to the project simply by observing my actions 
.722 -.178 
DOB2 It was easy for my manager to determine whether or not 
I was doing what I was supposed to be doing by 
observing my behavior 
.677 -.073 
DOB3 It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I 
was slacking off or working very hard on the project 
.650 -.088 
DOB4 My behaviors on the project were difficult for my 
manager to evaluate 
.826 -.020 
DMO1 It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I 
achieved specified outcome targets 
.833 -.216 
DMO2 It was difficult for my manager to measure the specific 
performance outcomes of my work on the project 
.858 -.063 
DMO3 The outcomes of the work I did on the project were easy 
for my manager to specify 
.746 -.135 
DMO4 The outcomes of my work on the project were difficult 
for my manager to evaluate 
.761 -.229 
CC1 Shared norms and values among the project team 
members influenced their project-related behaviors 
-.024 .892 
CC2 A common vision of the project influenced how the 
project team members behaved during the project 
-.262 .889 
CC3 All project team members attempted to be “regular” 
members of the project team 
-.133 .798 
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The clan control items load cleanly onto one factor. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 3-item 
clan control scale is .85. The difficulty of observing behavior and difficulty of measuring 
outcomes items, however, also load onto only one factor. A second factor analysis was 
conducted with the difficulty of observing behavior (DOB) and difficulty of measuring outcomes 
(DMO) items, specifying two factors, to see if the items could be distinguished into two scales. 
The two specified factors explain 67.88% of the variance in the measures. The results of this 
factor analysis are shown in Table 22 below. 
 
Table 22: Factor Analysis for DOB and DMO, with Two Factors Specified 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 
DOB1 My manager could not tell how well I was contributing 
to the project simply by observing my actions 
.718 .288 
DOB2 It was easy for my manager to determine whether or not 
I was doing what I was supposed to be doing by 
observing my behavior 
.827 .056 
DOB3 It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I 
was slacking off or working very hard on the project 
.122 .894 
DOB4 My behaviors on the project were difficult for my 
manager to evaluate 
.434 .763 
DMO1 It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I 
achieved specified outcome targets 
.705 .494 
DMO2 It was difficult for my manager to measure the specific 
performance outcomes of my work on the project 
.606 .612 
DMO3 The outcomes of the work I did on the project were easy 
for my manager to specify 
.677 .369 
DMO4 The outcomes of my work on the project were difficult 
for my manager to evaluate 
.722 .363 
 
DOB3 and DOB4 load cleanly onto one factor, and these two items capture the spirit of 
the DOB construct in a way that is clear and concise. They will be used as the DOB scale. In 
turn, DOB1, DOB2, DMO1, DMO3 and DMO4 load cleanly onto one factor and capture the 
spirit of the DMO construct. Since DMO2 loads strongly on both factors it was excluded from 
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the analysis, and a second factor analysis specifying two factors was conducted. The results of 
this factor analysis are shown in Table 23 below. 
 
Table 23: Second Factor Analysis for DOB and DMO, with Two Factors Specified 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 
DOB1 My manager could not tell how well I was contributing 
to the project simply by observing my actions 
.724 .291 
DOB2 It was easy for my manager to determine whether or not 
I was doing what I was supposed to be doing by 
observing my behavior 
.825 .064 
DOB3 It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I 
was slacking off or working very hard on the project 
.156 .921 
DOB4 My behaviors on the project were difficult for my 
manager to evaluate 
.464 .750 
DMO1 It was difficult for my manager to determine whether I 
achieved specified outcome targets 
.724 .443 
DMO3 The outcomes of the work I did on the project were easy 
for my manager to specify 
.698 .323 
DMO4 The outcomes of my work on the project were difficult 
for my manager to evaluate 
.743 .324 
 
The two factors explain 70.17% of the variance in the items. The Cronbach’s alpha for 
the resulting DOB scale is .77, and for DMO is .86. 
5.1.4 Individual effort toward task, and individual coordination success 
When all the items for individual effort toward task (IEFF) and individual coordination success 
(ICS) were loaded into a factor analysis, two factors emerged with eigenvalues over 1.0. These 
two factors explain 69.63% of the variance in the  measurement items. Results of the factor 
analysis are presented in Table 24 on the next page. 
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Table 24: Factor Analysis for IEFF and ICS 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 
IEFF1 Amount of energy I expended toward project-
related tasks 
.083 .913 
IEFF2 The intensity of my effort on project-related 
task 
.235 .885 
IEFF3 My effort toward making the project a success .139 .883 
IEFF4 My total level of exertion on the project -.020 .942 
ICS1 Resources I needed to do my work on the 
project were available when I needed them 
.808 -.126 
ICS2 When I was dependent on other team members 
to finish something before I could begin my 
work they finished on time 
.814 .162 
ICS3 It was easy to integrate my work with that of 
other team members 
.846 -.076 
ICS4 I understood what parts of the task I was 
responsible for and how those parts of the task 
related to the parts that were the responsibility 
of other team members 
.640 .451 
ICS5 When I needed to access the specialized 
knowledge or expertise of other team members, 
I was able to do so 
.709 .231 
ICS6 I often was left with nothing to do because I had 
to wait for other team members to finish their 
work 
.368 .353 
ICS7 Overall, my work was successfully coordinated 
with that of other team members 
.826 .321 
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The individual effort items all load cleanly onto one factor. Together, they also exhibit 
excellent reliability, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .94. 
Item ICS6 is dropped from the analysis because it doesn’t load cleanly onto any one 
factor, and because it may confuse respondents because it has two concepts included in it – 
having nothing to do, and the state of having nothing to do being caused by waiting for other 
team members to finish their work. It is likely that individuals would have other work to do 
while waiting for team members to finish their work, and thus might be confused about how to 
respond to this item. 
After dropping ICS6, the resulting scale for individual coordination success has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .88. 
5.1.5 Team effort toward task, and team coordination success 
When all the team effort toward task (TEFF) and team coordination success (TCS) items were 
loaded into a factor analysis, two factors emerged, explaining 68.70% of the variance in the 
items. The results of this factor analysis are displayed in Table 25 on the following page. 
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Table 25: Factor Analysis for TEFF and TCS 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 
TEFF1 Amount of energy I expended toward project-
related tasks 
.094 .868 
TEFF2 The intensity of my effort on project-related 
task 
.208 .931 
TEFF3 My effort toward making the project a success .315 .849 
TEFF4 My total level of exertion on the project .167 .907 
TCS1 Resources I needed to do my work on the 
project were available when I needed them 
.727 .002 
TCS2 When I was dependent on other team members 
to finish something before I could begin my 
work they finished on time 
.739 .310 
TCS3 It was easy to integrate my work with that of 
other team members 
.768 .183 
TCS4 I understood what parts of the task I was 
responsible for and how those parts of the task 
related to the parts that were the responsibility 
of other team members 
.742 .348 
TCS5 When I needed to access the specialized 
knowledge or expertise of other team members, 
I was able to do so 
.773 .361 
TCS6 I often was left with nothing to do because I had 
to wait for other team members to finish their 
work 
.495 .011 
TCS7 Overall, my work was successfully coordinated 
with that of other team members 
.845 .240 
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As expected, the factor structure is very similar to the individual-level items. As with the 
individual-level items, all four team effort toward task items will be retained. The  measure has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .93. 
For the team coordination success measure, TCS6 will be dropped from the analysis,  
because it does not load strongly on the factor that all the other items load onto. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the resulting scale is .89. 
5.1.6 Product performance 
The items for product performance were entered into a factor analysis along with three items 
measuring the project’s control over its resources. This factor analysis is shown in Table 26 on 
the next page. Although the three project resource control items are not used in the analyses to 
test the study hypotheses, they are included in the factor analysis to test the discriminant validity 
of the product performance items. Two factors emerge with eigenvalues over 1.0, and the 
loadings line up cleanly by construct. All items from the product performance scale will be 
retained in the analysis. 
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Table 26:  Factor Analysis for Product Performance and Resource Control Items 
Item Item Text Factor 1 Factor 2 
PRODP1 Users perceive that the project deliverable 
meets intended functional requirements 
.890 .270 
PRODP2 The information provided by the project 
deliverable meets user expectations 
.890 .247 
PRODP3 The project deliverable meets user expectations 
with respect to ease of use 
.914 .180 
PRODP4 Users are satisfied with the overall quality of 
the project deliverable 
.932 .211 
RESC1 
Control over project costs 
.161 .846 
RESC2 
Control over project schedule 
.238 .905 
RESC3 
Overall control exercised over the project 
.267 .894 
 
Cronbach’s alpha for the product performance scale is .95, and for the resource control 
scale is .89. 
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5.2 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.2.1 Individual-level analysis descriptive statistics 
Table 27 below shows the descriptive statistics for the constructs in the individual-level analysis. 
Correlations between these constructs are shown in Table 28 on the next page. 
 
Table 27: Descriptive Statistics of Constructs in Individual-Level Analysis 
Construct Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Behavior Control 4.73 1.50 1.00 7.00 
Outcome Control 4.72 1.30 1.00 7.00 
Clan Control 5.19 1.36 1.00 7.00 
Difficulty of 
Observing Behaviors 
2.47 1.28 1.00 6.00 
Difficulty of 
Measuring Outcomes 
2.57 1.15 1.00 6.40 
Individual Effort 
toward Task 
5.75 1.02 2.75 7.00 
Individual 
Coordination Success 
5.66 .99 1.67 7.00 
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Table 28: Correlations among Constructs in Individual-Level Analysis 
 BC OC CC DOB DMO IEFF ICS 
Behavior 
Control (BC) 
1.00       
Outcome 
Control (OC) 
.375(**) 1.00      
Clan Control 
(CC) 
-.022 -.090 1.00     
Difficulty of 
Observing 
Behaviors 
(DOB) 
.006 .061 -.174 1.00    
Difficulty of 
Measuring 
Outcomes 
(DMO) 
.088 -.024 -.329(**) .544(**) 1.00   
Individual 
Effort toward 
Task (IEFF) 
.115 .136 .138 -.407(**) -.315(**) 1.00  
Individual 
Coordination 
Success (ICS) 
-.164 -.059 .585(**) -.259(*) -.465(**) .287(*) 1.00 
** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
5.2.2 Tests of the individual-level research model and hypotheses 
In order to test the hypotheses in the individual-level model, two separate regressions 
were performed, one for each of the dependent variables. For the first regression, individual 
effort toward task was the dependent variable, and the independent variables were entered 
hierarchically into the regression: first the control variable, task difficulty, then the independent 
variables, and finally the interaction terms. 
Standard pre-requisites for regression analysis were checked, and all requirements are 
met for standard OLS regression. A plot of the residuals shows that they are approximately 
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normally distributed. In addition, plots of the dependent variable vs each independent variable 
reveal that the relationships between them are linear. Finally, tolerance and variance inflation 
factors were calculated, and neither indicated any problems with multicollinearity in the data. 
Outlier tests were conducted, and four outlier data points were excluded from the analysis. The 
sample size for the regression after removing the outliers was 70 cases.  
Table 29 on the following page presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis 
with individual effort toward task as the dependent variable. 
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 Table 29: Regression Results for Individual Effort Toward Task 
 Step 1: Control Var  Step 2: Independent 
Vars 
 Step 3: Interaction 
Term 
 Std β Std Err  Std β Std Err  Std β Std Err 
Constant 4.240(***) .519  4.864(***) .603  5.150(***) .556 
         
Task Difficulty .303(***) .102  .219(**) .098  .173(*) .091 
         
Behavior 
Control 
   .053 .077  .070 .071 
         
Outcome 
Control 
   .195(*) .083  .218(**) .076 
         
Clan Control    -.061 .091  -.077 .084 
         
Difficulty of 
Observing 
Behaviors 
(DOB) 
   -.294(**) .115  -.330(**) .108 
         
Difficulty of 
Measuring 
Outcomes 
(DMO) 
   -.268(*) .128  -.205 .118 
         
DOB*BC       .117 .057 
         
DMO*OC       .309(***) .069 
         
Adj R2  .107   .343   .453 
Δ Adj R2  .107   .236   .110 
F Change  8.749   5.610   6.917 
Significance  .004   < .001   .002 
         
*** = significant at the .01 level  
**   = significant at the .05 level 
*     = significant at the .10 level 
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The first step of the hierarchical regression analysis examines the effect of the control 
variable, task difficulty, on individual effort toward task. This regression is significant (F = 
8.749, p < .01), and the adjusted R2 is 10.7%. The control variable, task difficulty, is shown to be 
positively related to individual effort toward task (β = .303, p < .01), which was expected, as 
more difficult tasks should require a greater level of effort to accomplish. 
In the second step of the hierarchical regression analysis the main study variables were 
added to the regression equation, including all variables that will be part of interaction terms in 
the third step. In order to facilitate the interpretation of interaction terms in the final step, all 
variables that are part of  interaction terms were mean-centered prior to performing the analysis. 
The addition of the main study variables resulted in an increase in adjusted R2 of 23.6%, and the 
change is statistically significant (ΔF = 5.610, p < .001). The first three hypotheses predict that 
each of the three modes of control (behavior control, outcome control, and clan control) will 
have a positive relationship with individual effort toward task. Only H2 is supported, as outcome 
control is shown to have a positive relationship to effort toward task (β = .195, p < .10). In 
addition, in this step difficulty of observing behaviors (β = -.294, p < .05) and difficulty of 
measuring outcomes (β = -.268, p < .10) were also shown to be significantly related to effort 
toward task, suggesting that as behaviors become more difficult to observe and outcomes 
become more difficult to measure, effort toward task decreases. 
In the final step of the hierarchical regression the interaction terms were entered into the 
equation. The interaction terms are included to test H6 and H7, which predict that as behaviors 
become more difficult to observe behavior control will have a smaller effect on effort toward 
task, and as outcomes become more difficult to measure outcome control will have a smaller 
effect on effort toward task. Adding the interaction terms increases adjusted R2 by 11.0% (ΔF = 
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6.917, p < .01), and adjusted R2 for the full model is 45.3%. In this regression all the variables 
that were significant in prior steps remain significant. The interaction between behavior control 
and difficulty of observing behaviors is not significantly related to effort toward task, so H6, 
which posits that the more difficult it is to observe behaviors the less behavior control will affect 
effort toward task, was not supported. The interaction between difficulty of measuring outcomes 
and outcome control, however, is shown to be significantly related to effort toward task (β = 
.309, p < .01). This interaction term tests H7, which predicts that the effect of outcome control on 
effort toward task becomes weaker as difficulty of measuring outcomes increases. 
To further interpret the interaction between outcome control and difficulty of measuring  
outcomes a graph was constructed following the procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991). 
The graph shown in Figure 3 below shows the relationship between outcome control and effort 
toward task at high levels of difficulty of measuring outcomes and low levels of difficulty of 
measuring outcomes. For the purposes of this analysis, high and low levels of outcome control 
and difficulty of measuring outcomes were defined as one standard deviation above and below 
the means for those constructs, respectively. Figure 3 suggests that at high levels of difficulty of 
measuring outcomes (DMO), higher outcome control (OC) is associated with higher effort 
toward task, while at lower levels of difficulty of measuring outcomes higher outcome control is 
associated with lower effort toward task. This effect is opposite to what was hypothesized. Thus, 
H7 is not supported. 
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Figure 3: Interpretation of the Interaction between Outcome Control and DMO 
 
H4 and H5 predict that behavior control and clan control will have a positive relationship 
with coordination success. A second regression was used to test these hypotheses. In this 
regression, the independent variables are behavior control and clan control, along with a control 
variable, IS development project complexity (ISDPC). The dependent variable is individual 
coordination success. As with the first regression, the standard prerequisites for OLS regression 
were checked before proceeding with the regression analysis. Table 30 below presents the results 
of the regression analysis. The sample size for this regression was 73 cases. 
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Table 30: Regression Results for Individual Coordination Success 
 Std β Std Err 
Constant 3.683(***) .539 
   
Complexity .111 .083 
   
Behavior Control -.205(*) .072 
   
Clan Control .577(***) .070 
   
Adj R2 .348  
Significance < .001  
   
*** = significant at the .001 level  
*   = significant at the .10 level 
 
The regression equation is statistically significant, with adjusted R2 of 34.8% (F = 
13.807,  p < .001). The control variable, IS development project complexity, is not significantly 
related to coordination success. Behavior control is significantly related to coordination success 
(β = -.205, p < .10), but H4 is not supported because the relationship between behavior control 
and coordination success is opposite to what was hypothesized. That is, as behavior control 
increases coordination success decreases. H5, however, is supported. There is a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between clan control and coordination success (β = .577, p < 
.001). Table 31 below summarizes the results of the individual-level analysis. 
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Table 31: Summary of Results of Individual-Level Analysis 
 Hypothesis Result 
H1 Behavior control will have a positive relationship with effort 
toward task 
Not supported 
H2 Outcome control will have a positive relationship with effort 
toward task 
Supported 
H3 Clan control will have a positive relationship with effort toward 
task 
Not supported 
H4 Behavior control will have a positive relationship with 
coordination success 
Not supported; 
Relationship exists, but 
in opposite direction 
H5 Clan control will have a positive relationship with coordination 
success 
Supported 
H6 The more difficult the controlee believes it is for the controller 
to observe behaviors, the weaker the positive effect of behavior 
control on effort toward task 
Not supported 
H7 The more difficult the controlee believes it is for the controller 
to measure outcomes, the weaker the positive effect of outcome 
control on effort toward task 
Not supported; 
Relationship exists, but 
in opposite direction 
 
5.3 TEAM-LEVEL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.3.1 Team-level analysis descriptive statistics 
The team-level analysis examines the impact of control on performance, proposing that the 
effects of control on performance are mediated by their effects on effort toward task and 
coordination success. Table 32 on the next page presents the descriptive statistics for the 
constructs in the team-level analysis, and Table 33 presents the correlations among them. 
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Table 32: Descriptive Statistics of Constructs in Team-Level Analysis 
Construct Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Behavior Control 4.56 1.48 1.00 7.00 
Outcome Control 4.53 1.31 1.00 7.00 
Clan Control 5.12 1.29 1.33 7.00 
Effort Toward Task 5.47 .85 4.00 7.00 
Coordination Success 5.40 .88 3.17 6.83 
Product Performance 5.92 .93 1.75 7.00 
Resource Overruns .15 .25 -.42 .97 
 
 
Table 33: Correlations among Constructs in Team-Level Analysis 
 BC OC CC TEFF TCS PRODP RESOV
Behavior Control 
(BC) 
1.00       
Outcome Control 
(OC) 
.347(*) 1.00      
Clan Control (CC) -.042 .022 1.00     
Effort Toward Task 
(TEFF) 
-.048 .090 .370(*) 1.00    
Coordination 
Success (TCS) 
-.143 -.050 .658(**) .546(**) 1.00   
Product Performance 
(PRODP) 
.112 .233 .379(*) -.062 .189 1.00  
Resource Overruns 
(RESOV) 
.185 -.169 -.238 .054 -.167 -.273 1.00 
** = significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
*   = significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
5.3.2 Tests of the team-level research model and hypotheses 
Partial-Least-Squares analysis (PLS) was used to test the hypotheses in the team-level 
research model. The dataset for analysis is small, with data on only 36 project teams, and PLS is 
appropriate for exploratory research with small datasets. In the PLS analysis, path coefficients, 
which are similar to regression coefficients, were determined by running the PLS algorithm. In 
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order to determine the statistical significance of the path coefficients, a bootstrapping procedure 
was used which randomly duplicated and replaced data in the original dataset to come up with 
200 separate samples of 100 cases each. Two separate PLS models were set up and analyzed. 
The first used the product performance perceptual measure as the dependent variable. The 
second used the objective resource overruns variable as the dependent variable. In each model 
direct paths were included between the three modes of control and performance in order to test 
whether or not their effects on performance are mediated by team effort toward task and team 
coordination success, as hypothesized in H13 and H14.  
The following figures demonstrate the results of the PLS analysis. Paths that are 
statistically significant are shown with bold lines, and non-significant paths are shown with 
dotted lines. Figure 4 on the next page shows the results of the PLS analysis with product 
performance as the dependent variable. Product performance is a variable meant to reflect 
whether or not the system produced or enhanced by the project met the needs of its users in terms 
of quality, ease of use, and fulfilling requirements. This model explains 28.2% of the variance in 
the product performance construct. 
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= significant path
= non-significant path
 
Figure 4: Results of PLS Analysis with Product Performance as the Dependent Variable 
 
Figure 5 on the next page shows the results of the second PLS analysis, in which resource 
overruns was the dependent variable. Resource overruns, an objective measure, was measured as 
the average percentage of budget, schedule, and systems and programming effort overrun or 
underrun for the project. As such, this measure reflects the success of the project in terms of 
meeting goals for budget, schedule, and programming effort use. Because overruns are 
considered poor performance, a negative relationship between an independent variable and 
resource overruns means that that independent variable is associated with improved performance. 
This model explains 18.5% of the variance in the resource overruns variable. 
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Figure 5: Results of PLS Analysis with Resource Overruns as the Dependent Variable 
 
The direct paths between the control modes and the performance-related dependent variables 
demonstrate some direct effects of control on performance in the two PLS analyses. Behavior 
control is not significantly related to product performance, but is significantly related to 
improved performance in the form of reduced resource overruns (β = -.280, p < .01). In contrast 
to behavior control, outcome control has a positive and significant relationship with product 
performance (β = .256, p < .05), but no significant relationship to resource overruns. Clan control 
is shown to have a statistically significant relationship to both product performance (β = .393, p 
< .05) and resource overruns (β = -.203, p < .10).  
H8 through H12 propose the effects of the control modes on the mediators in the model,  
effort toward task and coordination success. H8 and H9, which propose that behavior control and 
outcome control will both have a positive relationship with effort toward task, are not supported. 
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H11, which proposes that behavior control will have a positive relationship with coordination 
success, is also not supported. Thus, there are no statistically significant relationships 
demonstrated in the PLS analysis between the formal modes of control and either effort toward 
task or coordination success. The relationship between clan control and effort toward task (β = 
.365, p < .01) and coordination success (β = .653, p < .01) are both statistically significant, 
however, providing support for H10 and H12. 
As part of the proposed mediated effects of control on performance, effort toward task 
and coordination success were proposed in H13 and H14 to be positively associated with 
performance. Neither hypothesis was supported. Contrary to H13 and H14, effort toward task 
was shown to have a significant negative relationship to product performance (β = -.239, p < .05) 
and a significant positive relationship to decreased performance in the form of increased resource 
overruns (β = .212, p < .05). There is no significant relationship demonstrated between 
coordination success and either performance variable.   
Table 34 on the next page summarizes the results of the team-level analysis. 
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 Table 34: Summary of Team-Level Analysis Results 
 Hypothesis Result 
H8 Behavior control will have a positive 
relationship with effort toward task 
Not supported 
H9 Outcome control will have a positive 
relationship with effort toward task 
Not supported 
H10 Clan control will have a positive relationship 
with effort toward task 
Supported 
H11 Behavior control will have a positive 
relationship with coordination success 
Not supported 
H12 Clan control will have a positive relationship 
with coordination success 
Supported 
H13 Team effort toward task will have a positive 
relationship with performance, mediating the 
effects of behavior control, outcome control, and 
clan control on performance 
Not supported; Team effort was 
shown to have a negative relationship 
with both performance dimensions 
H14 Team coordination success will have a positive 
relationship with performance, mediating the 
effects of behavior control and clan control on 
performance 
Not supported 
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6.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS – INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Although only two of the seven hypotheses tested in the individual-level analysis were clearly 
supported, the analysis still has several interesting results that can contribute to our 
understanding of control and coordination of IS development projects. In addition, the 
measurement model challenges and the surprising findings that were counter to what was 
hypothesized provide interesting insights and questions for further research.  
The individual-level regressions proved to be fairly robust. The adjusted R2 values of 
45.3% for the regression on individual effort toward task and 34.8% for the regression on 
individual coordination success suggest that the study models were able to explain a significant 
amount of variation in these variables. In the following sections the results of the individual-level 
analysis will be discussed in more detail. 
6.1.1 Effects of control on individual effort toward task 
Behavior control, outcome control, and clan control were all hypothesized to have a positive 
relationship with individual effort toward task. Only outcome control, however, was significantly 
related to individual effort toward task in the analysis.  
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Behavior control was expected to be positively related to individual effort toward task 
because behavior control works through the specification of behaviors that are appropriate for 
successful completion of a task, and then basing rewards or sanctions on compliance with the 
specified behaviors. It was hypothesized that an individual in an organization would attempt to 
gain rewards or avoid sanctions by complying with the specified behaviors. This, in turn, would 
keep the individual on task, thus increasing individual effort toward task. The analysis showed 
no significant relationship between behavior control and individual effort toward task. It is 
possible that this lack of a significant relationship between behavior control and individual effort 
toward task is the result of measurement issues, conceptual issues related to the nature of 
behavior control, or with failure to account for the effect of roles in the study conceptualization. 
The measurement of behavior control may have contributed to its lack of a significant 
relationship to individual effort toward task. Behavior control was measured from the 
perspective of the project manager in this study. In retrospect, it would have made sense to 
measure control from the perspective of the team members, because it is their perception of 
control that affects their behavior. Regardless of the degree to which the manager feels he is 
using behavior control, it cannot be expected to motivate controlee behavior unless the 
controlees also perceive that behavior control is being used. That is, the controlees must perceive 
that they will be rewarded or sanctioned based on their compliance with specified behaviors. 
From the perspective of the statistical analysis, we would not expect the manager’s perception of 
level of behavior control used to be related to the team member’s individual effort toward task 
unless the team member’s perception of the level of behavior control was highly correlated with 
the manager’s perception of the level of behavior control. 
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From a conceptual standpoint, the link between behavior control and effort may not be 
expected to be as strong as the link between outcome control and effort. Since behavior control 
works through specifying behaviors for controlees to follow, it may have more of an effect on 
how the controlees work, rather than how hard they work. It was hypothesized that behavior 
control would increase effort toward task by keeping individuals on task, but perhaps it only 
serves to control how they work on task when they are on task. Moreover, in retrospect behavior 
control could also conceivably decrease effort toward task by decreasing the amount of search 
activities and decision-making activities that must be undertaken by team members. Since 
behavior control involves the written specification of appropriate behaviors and procedures, team 
members following the specified procedures would not have to make as many choices as if 
procedures were not specified, and they would not have to expend effort in trying to discover 
appropriate procedures. Thus, after more in-depth conceptualization of the relationship between 
behavior control and effort toward task we might expect the relationship to be indeterminate. 
Another possibility is that the relative roles of the respondents in this study, managers 
and team members, carries an implicit expectation of evaluation and reward or sanction that 
overwhelms the specific effect of behavior control. In manager – team member relationships 
there is typically a formal structure in which the controller is responsible for evaluating the 
performance of the controlee in some way. The data collection process specifically sought these 
types of manager – team member relationships by asking people with a supervisory or 
managerial role with respect to a specific IS  development project to fill out the manager survey, 
and then, in turn, to ask the people who worked for them on the project to fill out the  survey. 
Controller-controlee relationships of this type generally come with an expectation of 
performance evaluation, which can lead to career benefits and sanctions, regardless of whether or 
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not the behavior evaluation and rewards and sanctions are made explicit through a formal 
behavior control mechanism. That is, in typical manager – team member relationships there is a 
general sense that a manager or supervisor will be observing the employees who work for him 
and making evaluations based on those observations, and that rewards and sanctions are tied to 
those observations. It is possible that this general sense based on relative roles is more salient to 
the team members than the manager’s perception of the level of behavior control utilized, and 
that in the statistical analysis the effect of relative roles overwhelms any variability in the 
manager’s perception of behavior control utilized. The controlee may perceive behavior control 
based on role as a given, rather than perceiving variability in a manager’s use of specific 
behavior control mechanisms.  
Outcome control was expected to be significantly related to individual effort toward task 
because outcome control consists of setting goals or targets related to task performance, and then 
applying rewards or sanctions based on whether or not the goals are met. Individuals who want 
to gain rewards or avoid sanctions are expected to work harder to ensure that they accomplish the 
goals that are set for them as part of the outcome control mechanism. As expected, outcome 
control had a statistically significant positive relationship with individual effort toward task. This 
relationship was consistent and robust, remaining statistically significant when various different 
combinations of items were used to measure outcome control. 
As with behavior control, outcome control was measured from the manager’s 
perspective, but this is less likely to pose a problem with outcome control. It is likely that the 
controlee’s perception of outcome control was similar to the controller’s perception of outcome 
control, since the items carry a strong sense of using explicit, pre-specified goals or targets, and 
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tying those goals or targets to performance evaluations and rewards. Because the goals and 
targets are explicit and pre-specified, they are visible to the controlee. 
Clan control was expected to be positively associated with individual effort toward task 
because the shared norms and values and common vision that influence behavior in clan control 
may also serve to keep team members on task. Moreover, the desire to be accepted as a “regular” 
member of the team was expected to motivate team members to work harder in order to be seen 
as contributing members of the team. However, there was no relationship demonstrated between 
clan control and individual effort toward task in the analysis. Perhaps clan control, like behavior 
control, has more of an effect on how team members work rather than how hard they work. This 
possibility is supported by the strong relationship between clan control and individual 
coordination success, which will be discussed in the next section. 
6.1.2 Effects of control on individual coordination success 
Both behavior control and clan control were proposed to have a positive relationship with 
individual coordination success. Both were shown to have a significant relationship with 
individual coordination success, but behavior control was associated with decreased individual 
coordination success, which was opposite to what was hypothesized. 
Clan control had a very strong relationship to individual coordination success in the 
analysis, supporting the idea that when shared norms and values, and a common vision of the 
project influence project-related behaviors it helps team members involved with the project to 
coordinate their work. 
Behavior control was expected to improve individual coordination success because 
behavior control often requires or relies on the production of artifacts that are representations of 
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the work that is being done. The written guidelines or procedures, schedules, walk-throughs, 
progress reports, and meetings that are typically associated with behavior control serve to make 
the work of team members more visible to each other, which in turn was expected to aid team 
members in coordinating their work. These mechanisms also may serve to improve coordination 
by pacing the progress of work, enabling temporal coordination. Finally, presenting and 
discussing the artifacts may also increase communication, which was expected to improve the 
success of coordination. 
In the regression analysis there was a statistically significant relationship between 
behavior control and coordination success, but it was a negative relationship, counter to what 
was hypothesized. One possible explanation for this result is that the items measuring behavior 
control in this study focus mainly on written rules and procedures, and may not adequately 
reflect the use of the behavior control mechanisms that were expected to influence coordination 
success, such as progress reports, walk-throughs, and meetings. However, even written rules and 
procedures were expected to improve coordination success through their effect on making work 
more visible. Another possibility is that the reliance on written rules and procedures that are part 
of behavior control actually served to hinder coordination efforts by forcing team members to 
adhere to formal processes that were not the best ways to accomplish the task. In complex 
knowledge work, such as IS development, complexity may make it difficult to specify 
appropriate steps beforehand, and the dynamic nature of IS development projects may require a 
level of flexibility that is inconsistent with rigid specifications of specific behaviors.  
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6.1.3 Effects of difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes 
It was proposed that the effects of the various control modes on effort toward task would be 
moderated by the difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes. The 
reasoning behind this expectation was that behavior control and outcome control rely on 
observability of behavior and measurability of outcomes in order to function properly. In the 
case of behavior control, if a controller cannot evaluate what the controlee is doing, or determine 
if what the controlee is doing is contributing to the project simply by observing the controlee’s 
behavior, then the controller will encounter difficulty in determining whether the controlee 
should be rewarded or sanctioned for his behavior. The controlee recognizes this difficulty, and 
thus may not work as hard, because he knows that the controller’s ability to observe and evaluate 
his actions is limited, and that the application of a reward or sanction cannot be directly 
determined through observation of behavior. 
Similarly, in the case of outcome control rewards and sanctions are tied to the 
achievement of specific outcomes. If the controlee believes that the controller will have difficulty 
measuring or specifying outcomes, then the controlee will not work as hard, because he knows 
that the reward or sanction cannot be easily determined through the measurement of outcomes 
associated with his work on the project. 
The interaction of behavior control and difficulty of observing behaviors was not a 
significant predictor of effort toward task in the regression analysis. Moreover, there was no 
main effect of behavior control on effort toward task. However, there was a statistically 
significant main effect of difficulty of observing behaviors on effort toward task. Difficulty in 
observing behaviors was associated with decreased effort toward task. Although this effect was 
not hypothesized, it is consistent with the conceptualization that motivated hypotheses on the 
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moderation effect. As discussed above in section 6.1.1 on the relationship of control and effort 
toward task, the relative roles of managers and team members in organizations imply a general 
sense of behavior control. That is, it is generally understood that a manager or supervisor will 
observe the employees who work for him, and make performance evaluations based on those 
observations. Given this role-based general expectation of behavior control, then, the negative 
effect of difficulty of observing behaviors on effort toward task can be seen as moderating the 
effect of this general sense of behavior control on effort toward task, much in the same way as 
the proposed moderating relationship between difficulty of observing behaviors and behavior 
control. A team member expects some level of observation and evaluation by his or her 
supervisor based on their relative roles, and this expectation can be expected to motivate effort 
toward task. However, if the team member perceives that it is difficult for the supervisor to 
observe behavior, then the general expectation of observation and evaluation based on relative 
roles is not as effective at motivating effort toward task, and effort toward task decreases. This 
general expectation based on relative roles was not measured in this study, so the effect shows up 
in the analysis as a main effect of difficulty of observing behaviors on individual effort toward 
task. 
The interaction between outcome control and difficulty of measuring outcomes was 
significantly related to individual effort toward task, but in a direction opposite to what was 
hypothesized. When it was more difficult to measure outcomes, higher levels of outcome control 
actually led to even higher levels of effort, rather than the lower levels that were hypothesized. 
One possible explanation for this result is that team members worked harder to try to overcome 
the manager’s difficulty in measuring outcomes. Higher levels of outcome control imply that 
pre-specified goals, targets,  and other results will  be strongly tied to performance evaluations. 
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Perhaps team members who perceive that managers will have difficulty measuring or evaluating 
outcomes will fear that their performance evaluation will be inaccurate because of the manager’s 
difficulty measuring or evaluating outcomes, and will try to work harder to either make the 
results or outcomes more obvious, or to send a secondary signal of performance in order to 
influence the performance evaluation. That is, team members may feel that if the outcomes 
cannot be easily measured, they should work harder to make the outcomes more obviously 
positive. Or, team members may decide that if outcomes are difficult to measure they will work 
harder, and the supervisor will notice their hard work and reward them appropriately.    
 
6.2 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS – TEAM LEVEL 
The results for the team-level analysis was not as robust as those for the individual level. 
Because of the difficulty of collecting matched sample data, at the time of the analysis data was 
only collected from 36 teams. After the removal of an outlier, only 35 cases were used in the 
analysis. A popular guideline for PLS analysis suggests that the adequate sample size for PLS 
analysis should be ten data points for each arrow pointing to the construct with the most arrows 
pointing to it. The performance variables in the team-level research models have seven arrows 
pointing to them, suggesting that a sample size of 70 would be ideal. At 35, the team-level 
sample size is very small, and the significance of the path coefficients is very sensitive to the 
parameters chosen for the bootstrapping procedure. Smart PLS Version 2.0.M3 (Ringle et al. 
2005 ) was used for the PLS analyses.  
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6.2.1 Effects of control on performance 
Hypotheses H8 through H10 propose that behavior control, outcome control, and clan control 
will all have a positive relationship with performance. The PLS analyses provide partial support 
for  hypotheses H8 and H9. Behavior control was associated with reduced resource overruns, but 
not to product performance. Conversely, outcome control was positively related to product 
performance, but not to resource overruns. H10 was fully supported, as clan control was 
positively related to product performance and negatively related to resource overruns. These 
results suggest that different modes of control may have different effects on performance. They 
also suggest that informal control modes such as clan control may be effective options for 
controlling complex tasks such as IS development. 
Behavior control was associated with reduced resource overruns, which was measured by 
asking project managers to indicate the percentages by which the project exceeded or fell short 
of budgeted time, money, and resource effort. The measure of behavior control used in this study 
focused on the use of written procedures and practices being an important part of the evaluation 
of team members, as well as holding team members accountable for their behavior during the 
project. It is likely that the behavior control mechanisms reflected by this measure are written 
plans and procedures that are part of a formalized systems development methodology, or some 
other formal planning system, and that team members were evaluated in part based on how 
closely they adhered to the formal methodology. This resulted in reduces reduced resource 
overruns, which reflects effective control of budget, schedule, and human resources. However, 
formal behavior control did not lead to improved product performance, which represents the 
functionality, quality, and ease of use of the system produced or enhanced in the project. 
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The relationship of outcome control to the performance variables was opposite to that of 
behavior control. Outcome control, or evaluation of team members based on results and their 
performance relative to pre-established targets, was not associated with resource overruns. It 
was, however, associated with improved product performance. Thus, linking evaluation and 
rewards to pre-established targets and results was associated with producing a better product. It 
is possible that some of the pre-established targets or results that were used to evaluate team 
members may have been related to user satisfaction, or to fulfilling a certain set of user 
requirements, and that this explains why evaluating team member performance based on those 
targets improved product performance.  
Clan control was significantly associated with improved product performance and with 
reduced resource overruns. When clan control is operating, shared norms and values influence 
project-related behaviors, a common vision of the project influences behavior, and team 
members attempt to be accepted as “regular” members of the project team. The analysis suggests 
that this resulted in both better control of project process variables, and also the production of a 
higher-quality product that better met the needs and expectations of its users. 
6.2.2 Mediation through team effort toward task and team coordination success 
The effects of the control modes on performance were expected to be at least partially mediated 
by team effort toward task and team coordination success. Accordingly, H8 through H12 propose 
that behavior control, clan control, and outcome control will have a positive relationship with 
team effort toward task and team coordination success, and H13 and H14 propose that team 
effort toward task and team coordination success will be positively associated with performance 
outcomes, mediating the effects of behavior control, outcome control, and clan control. 
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The results of the analyses do not support either partial or full mediation of the effects  of 
control on performance by either team effort toward task or team coordination success. Only clan 
control is significantly related to either of the proposed mediators. It has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship to both team effort toward task and team coordination 
success. Behavior control and outcome control are not significantly related to either mediator 
variable. Moreover, team coordination success is not significantly related to product performance 
or resource overruns, and team effort toward task is significantly related to both performance 
variables, but with a negative association. That is, team effort toward task decreases product 
performance and increases resource overruns. 
It is significant that, even with the small sample size, clan control had a highly significant 
and positive relationship to both team effort toward task and team coordination success. This 
suggests that when project-related behaviors are influenced by shared norms, values, and a 
common vision of the project, and when team members try to be accepted as regular members of 
the team, that this motivates them to work harder toward the task at hand, and also facilitates the 
coordination of their work. 
It is surprising that outcome control was not significantly related to team effort toward 
task, since it was positively associated with individual effort toward task in the individual-level 
analysis. One possibility for the lack of a significant relationship between outcome control and 
team effort toward task in the team-level analysis is that the sample size for the analysis was too 
small, and there is likely more error in the team effort toward task measure than in the individual 
effort toward task measure. In the team-level measure, team member respondents were asked to 
assess the effort level of the team as a whole, and it is possible that this may have been difficult 
for the team members to assess, since it may be difficult to gauge the average effort level of 
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other individuals on the project team, especially if the project has a large number of team 
members. It may be more appropriate to average the team members’ assessments of their 
individual effort toward task, and use the average for the team effort toward task value. This was 
attempted in a post-hoc analysis. Behavior control was still unrelated to effort toward task, but 
outcome control had a positive relationship with effort toward task that was close to being 
statistically significant (t-value = 1.57). 
Behavior control was not significantly related to team effort toward task in the main 
analysis, or in the post-hoc analysis using the average of the individual effort toward task scores 
of the team members. As mentioned in the individual-level study results, it is possible that 
behavior control can have two different effects on effort toward task. It could increase effort 
toward task through specifying behaviors that keep individuals on task, or through motivation by 
creating a sense that on-task effort will be rewarded. However, behavior control could also 
conceivably decrease effort toward task by decreasing the amount of search activities and 
decision-making activities that must be undertaken by team members. Thus, we might expect the 
relationship between behavior control and effort toward task to be indeterminate. 
The effort toward task construct has a similar problem. The construct reflects the amount 
and intensity of energy expended on project-related tasks. However, this could reflect both “bad” 
and “good” effort. That is, effort expended toward project-related tasks could reflect an increased 
effort to make the project a success, or could reflect effort that was necessary to overcome 
problems caused by internal or external factors that complicated the project. For example, 
changes in the competitive environment could necessitate a change in requirements that 
complicates the project and causes team members to have to expend more effort just to reach an 
acceptable level of performance. Similarly, a poor design decision could cause problems later on 
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in the development process that require extra effort to fix. In both these examples, the extra effort 
is not caused by motivation, and, while it could be expected to improve resource overruns all else 
being equal, it also reflects other unmeasured factors that can be expected to increase resource 
overruns. Thus, it is not surprising that team effort toward task was associated with decreased 
product performance and increased resource overruns.  
Another potential problem with the effort toward task construct is that the control modes 
could also potentially influence an individual’s perception of their own effort in ways opposite to 
those hypothesized. For example, if the control modes are successful in motivating an individual, 
the individual may get excited about the project and perceive their own effort level as being 
lower than it actually is. Or, if clan control is operating and the individual may perceive his own 
effort as less and attribute the effort more to the team. 
Team coordination success was also not related to performance outcomes. This is 
surprising. Similar to the team effort toward task measure, perhaps the measure of team 
coordination success has significant error caused by difficulty team members have in assessing 
the coordination outcomes of other team members. In a post-hoc analysis the average of team 
members’ individual coordination success measures was used to represent team coordination 
success. With this measure of team coordination success the analysis does show significant 
mediation of the effect of clan control on product performance through coordination success. 
6.3 LIMITATIONS 
There are several limitations that should be considered when reviewing the conclusions of this 
research. First, the research was conducted with a cross-sectional survey. Although the theory 
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motivating the hypotheses implies a direction to the relationships among the study constructs,  
this directionality cannot be confirmed through analysis of the study data. Another limitation of 
the cross-sectional survey design is that it requires respondents to report on a project that took 
place at some point in the past. This could introduce random error into the study through the 
inability of the respondents to remember accurately what happened during the project. An 
attempt was made to limit this source of error by asking respondents for data on projects that had 
been completed within the past two years. The retrospective nature of the survey responses could 
also introduce systematic error because the end result of the project could possibly bias the 
respondents’ view of events that took place during the project. 
Another concern with cross-sectional survey studies is the potential for common method 
bias. One type of common method bias is common source bias, which can be caused by 
assessing independent and dependent variables from the same respondents. In this study, the 
potential for common source bias was limited by measuring key independent and dependent 
variables from different respondents. In addition, to limit the effect of bias caused by implicit 
theories about relationships between the study constructs that may have been held by 
respondents, dependent variables were assessed earlier in the survey, and then independent 
variables were assessed later in the survey. Variables that are hypothesized to have direct 
relationships were separated from each other on the survey.  
Bias can also be introduced into a study by measuring all variables through the same 
method. In this study most of the variables were measured with 7-point Likert scales. One key 
dependent variable, resource overruns, was measured using a continuous scale consisting of an 
objective report of the project’s performance versus its budget, time, and resource use goals. 
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Including an objective measure for a key study variable has been demonstrated to reduce 
common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
In addition to the limitations of the cross-sectional survey design, there are also some 
limitations that are unique to this particular study. It proved very challenging to collect matched 
survey responses from IS project teams and their managers. As a result, the dataset used to test 
the hypotheses is fairly small, making it difficult to detect any relationships with small effect 
sizes, and limiting the range of statistical techniques that may be used to test the hypotheses. In 
order to increase the sample size, a second round of data collection is warranted. 
6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The results of this research provide several implications that may be useful to managers 
responsible for controlling IS development projects. First, the three modes of control examined, 
behavior control, outcome control, and clan control, all had some positive effects on intermediate 
outcomes, such as effort toward task and coordination success, as well as on performance 
outcomes such as product performance and resource overruns. This suggests that managers 
should make use of a portfolio of control modes in order to have a positive effect on a broad 
range of intermediate and ultimate performance outcomes. In particular, managers should be 
aware of the broad positive effects of clan control on their projects.  
Clan control and outcome control were demonstrated to have a positive effect on effort 
toward task, so managers who wish to ensure that members of their teams are working hard 
toward project tasks should utilize outcome controls and try to encourage clan control. Clan 
control was also strongly associated with coordination success. This suggests that managers who 
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are facing projects that potentially offer coordination challenges because of their complexity, 
size, or geographic distribution should consider making efforts to build clan control in the team. 
Clan control can be facilitated through team member selection by selecting team members who 
know each other and have worked well together on past projects, and by team-building activities 
and social interventions that help team members to develop social capital, which has been shown 
to be an important antecedent of clan control (Kirsch et al. forthcoming). Managers can also 
encourage clan control by encouraging project team members to act as a team, not as individuals. 
Clan control and outcome control also were shown to have positive effects on product 
quality. Managers who wish to build information systems that exhibit quality, usability, and meet 
the needs of their users should facilitate clan control, and institute outcome controls that 
explicitly tie evaluation and rewards to product-related outcomes. 
Clan control and behavior control were also associated with improved project 
performance in the form of decreased resource overruns. This suggests that managers who wish 
to improve their projects’ performance with respect to budget, time, and resource use goals 
should facilitate clan control on their teams, link performance evaluations to adherence to written 
rules and procedures, and hold team members accountable for their behavior on the project.  
In addition to these implications for the use of control modes, this study demonstrates the 
importance of team member perceptions of the observability of their work and the measurability 
of its outcomes. The results suggest that when team members perceive that their behaviors are 
observable by managers, they expend more effort toward project tasks. Managers should take 
advantage of this by making efforts to communicate to team members that their activities are 
being monitored and evaluated.  
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While the measurability of outcomes did not have a direct effect on effort, it did interact 
with outcome control to affect effort toward task. When managers utilized outcome control, but 
team members perceived that the outcomes of their work were difficult for managers to measure, 
team members worked harder. It is likely that this increased effort was an attempt by team 
members to make outcomes of their work more salient to managers, or to send a secondary 
signal that could favorably impact their manager’s evaluation of their work, even if the outcomes 
were difficult to measure. This suggests that outcome control can be a useful motivator, even if 
managers are not sure that they will be able to accurately measure the outcomes. 
6.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
In addition to its implications for practicing managers, this study also makes significant 
contributions to research on organizational control, particularly in the context of IS development 
projects. 
Existing research on organizational control provides theoretical arguments about the 
applicability of different control modes to different circumstances, and examines the controller’s 
choice of control mode based on antecedent conditions that include the controller’s knowledge of 
the production process, the observability of behavior, and the measurability of outcomes. The 
theory behind this research assumes that controller’s are rational, and that they will attempt to 
choose the control modes that will be most effective, given their own level of knowledge of the 
production process, and the levels of behavior observability and outcome measurability in the 
task context. The two analyses reported on in this dissertation extend this stream of literature by 
testing the theory of organizational control in a more direct fashion, not by assuming rational 
 100 
managers and examining their control choices based on antecedent conditions, but by directly 
measuring the effects of control modes on a range of outcomes, while taking into account the 
effects of behavior observability and outcome measurability. The range of outcomes investigated 
in this study includes the intermediate outcomes effort toward task and coordination success, and 
project outcomes including product performance and resource overruns. By investigating both 
intermediate and ultimate outcomes, and by proposing and testing the mediating role of the 
intermediate outcomes, this study provides insight into the mechanisms through which control 
efforts affect IS development project performance. 
Another way in which the study reported on in this dissertation contributes to 
understanding of the mechanisms through which organizational control works is by examining 
the effects of control on controlees, and by taking the controlees’ perceptions of observability of 
behaviors and measurability of outcomes into account. Ultimately, control works through its 
effects on the behaviors of controlees, so it is important to begin to investigate these behavioral 
effects, and how they are moderated by controlee perceptions of their work context, such as the 
difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes. 
More specifically, the study reported in this dissertation provides evidence that control 
does have an effect on intermediate outcomes and performance outcomes, and that different 
modes of control affect different outcomes. Given the paucity of research demonstrating a 
relationship between control and performance outcomes, this evidence is valuable.  
Existing theory on organizational control posits that the effectiveness of control depends  
on behavior observability and outcome measurability. The individual-level analysis provides 
support for existing theory by demonstrating that these contextual variables are important. They 
have direct effects on effort toward task, and outcome measurability moderates the effect of 
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outcome control on effort toward task. In a surprising result from the individual-level analysis, 
however, the moderating effect of outcome measurability on effort toward task works counter to 
what was hypothesized. Instead of decreasing the effectiveness of outcome control, difficulty of 
measuring outcomes actually increased the effectiveness of outcome control at motivating effort. 
Finally, this study introduces new measures for individual and team coordination success 
that are grounded in coordination theory, adapted for complex tasks, and that exhibit good 
convergent and discriminant validity, as well as excellent reliability. 
6.6 FUTURE RESEARCH 
During the course of designing, carrying out, and analyzing the results of the study reported in 
this dissertation many challenges were faced. Nevertheless, it still provides some interesting 
results that contribute to the literature. The challenges and the interesting results provide insight 
and guidance for future research, as future research should attempt to overcome the challenges 
faced by the current research, as well as build on the results of the current research. 
The first area that provided challenges to the current research and should be addressed in 
future research is the conceptualization and measurement of formal control. The measures 
originally developed for behavior control and outcome control were based on existing research, 
but they did not exhibit convergent or discriminant validity, or adequate reliability. After 
dropping and recombining the items, measures for behavior control and outcome control were 
constructed that had acceptable convergent and discriminant validity, but the reliability of the 
outcome control measure was still weak, just reaching the .60 Cronbach’s alpha threshold for 
exploratory research. Although these measures were sufficient to reach some interesting results 
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in the current research, there is a need to develop improved measures for future research. 
Behavior control and outcome control are complex constructs, and after the dropping and 
recombining of items for this study it is unclear whether the measures still reflect all the concepts 
that make  up behavior control and clan control. In the measure for behavior control, for 
example, three of the four items measure whether evaluations of team members are linked to 
adherence to written steps, rules, and procedures. While adherence to written guidelines is an 
important part of behavior control, behavior control also includes other concepts that were not 
reflected in the final measure. Because of this, the behavior control measure is lacking in face 
validity.  
The outcome control measure, besides having marginal reliability, also has diminished 
face validity because it includes an item that was originally intended to measure behavior 
control. 
There is a need for future research to develop measures that cover the entire conceptual 
range of behavior control and outcome control. As part of this effort it might be useful to develop 
an exhaustive list of control mechanisms used in practice, and then attempt to code which facet 
or facets of behavior or outcome control are represented by each mechanism. Then, examining  
patterns of mechanism use can then help us to determine whether behavior control and outcome 
control are implemented as unitary constructs, or in smaller conceptual pieces. This is an 
important empirical question, because it is uncertain whether practicing managers perceive 
behavior control and outcome control as two distinct things which they implement as part of 
their management practice. It is possible that managers, instead, think in terms of specific 
mechanisms as part of their management practice. The factor analysis for the behavior control 
and outcome control items developed for the current research revealed four factors. This suggests 
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that the constructs behavior control and outcome control may be too broad, and need to be 
divided into smaller constructs. Alternatively, it is possible that behavior control and outcome 
control should be modeled as second order constructs consisting of several different components. 
Future research should also carefully consider whether behavior control and outcome 
control are measured from the controller’s or the controlee’s perspective. The study reported here 
measured behavior control and outcome control from the perspective of the controller. This is 
because the research takes an instrumental view of behavior control and outcome control as tools 
that can be manipulated by managers in order to achieve desired results. If measured from the 
controlee’s perspective, it is more difficult to figure out how a manager can manipulate these 
variables in practice. However, the controlee’s perspective would also be relevant if the objective 
of the research is to investigate how control affects behavior in organizations. There is evidence 
that the perspectives of the controller and controlee do differ. The measures for behavior control  
and clan control proposed for this dissertation were originally developed for another study, in 
which IS project team members responded to the items. The factor analysis results of the items 
from that dataset are significantly different from the factor analysis results in this dissertation. 
When the team members were used to measure behavior control and outcome control only two 
factors emerged, and the items loaded onto factors differently from how they do in the current 
study, in which the behavior control and outcome control items were measured from the project 
managers. This suggests that managers and team members perceive of control in different ways. 
The individual-level analysis demonstrated that team member perceptions of the 
difficulty of observing their behavior and measuring the outcomes of their work have significant 
effects on their project-related behavior. To investigate these effects in more detail the measures 
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for difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes also should be 
improved. 
The significant relationships between outcome control and individual effort toward task 
in the individual-level analysis and between clan control and team effort toward task in the team-
level analysis suggest that control does have an effect on motivation. However, the results of 
these analyses also suggest that effort toward task may be too broad a construct, with too many 
confounds to be useful in future research. The construct appears to capture a broad range of types 
of effort, including effort that is the result of increased motivation, effort required to conform to 
process requirements, and effort required to overcome difficulties caused by internal or external 
factors. Although most of these types of effort can be expected to improve performance 
outcomes, some of them also reflect factors that can be expected to have significant negative 
effects on performance outcomes, which makes it likely that the relationship between effort 
toward task and project performance will be indeterminate and more closely related to 
idiosyncratic aspects of specific projects than to any general theoretical factors. For example, 
consider a project in which outcome control has been implemented, and team member evaluation 
and reward is specifically tied to the achievement of a broad range of process-related and 
product-related outcomes. This type of outcome control can be expected to motivate team 
members and increase their effort toward task. This increased effort, in turn, is expected to 
improve performance. Now imagine that the same project runs into problems because of poor 
design decisions, or because of changes in the environment. These problems also necessitate a 
higher level of effort by team members in order to be overcome. This effort can be expected to 
improve project performance to a higher level than it would have been if the effort was not 
expended. However, the effort also reflects the problems, which can be expected to reduce 
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project performance. If the effects of the idiosyncratic elements overwhelms the positive effects 
of effort, then effort toward task could have a negative relationship with performance outcomes, 
as it does in the team-level analysis. 
In addition, an individual’s perceptions of their own effort may not be an accurate 
reflection of their actual effort. If an individual is motivated and excited about the project he may 
perceive his own effort level as lower than it actually is. Or, if the individual is part of a team in  
which clan control is operating the individual may attribute more of the effort to the team, and 
thus underestimate his own effort level.  
Future research should attempt to solve these challenges by taking a step back on the 
causal chain and measuring the effects of control on motivation rather than on effort, or by 
attempting to measure different types of effort so that the “good” effort may be separated from 
the “bad” effort. 
Future research should also address the surprising interaction effect between outcome 
control and difficulty of observing outcomes. Contrary to what was hypothesized, outcome 
control was associated with higher effort toward task when outcomes were difficult to measure. 
This suggests that team members, rather than slacking off because the outcomes of their work 
were difficult to measure, worked harder in order to make the outcomes more visible, or to send 
a secondary signal of their work performance since they questioned the ability of their manager 
to measure the outcomes. This is interesting because it suggests that imperfect control systems, 
which have been thought to have only negative consequences, may also have some positive 
consequences. 
This study also suggested that different types of control have different types of effects on 
performance. Outcome control was associated with increased product quality, while behavior 
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control was associated with a reduction in resource overruns. Clan control was associated with 
both positive performance outcomes. Future research should examine these differential effects in 
more detail. 
Finally, although there was no relationship between behavior control and coordination 
success in the analyses reported here, the theoretical arguments for the relationship are strong, 
and deserve a second look after better measures for behavior and outcome control are developed. 
  
6.7 CONCLUSION 
Research on organizational control has focused on the controller’s choice of control mode, 
assuming that the controller will choose the control mode that is most effective, given the 
controller’s level of knowledge, the observability of behavior, and the measurability of 
outcomes. The research reported here haa attempted to test the assumption that observability of 
behavior and measurability of outcomes moderate the effectiveness of control by testing whether 
or not the effects of control on effort toward task and coordination success depend on team 
member perceptions of the difficulty of observing behaviors or difficulty of measuring outcomes. 
Moreover, they have attempted to increase understanding of the mechanisms through which 
control works by investigating whether effort toward task and coordination success mediate the 
effects of control on performance outcomes. 
The results, though somewhat limited by small sample size and measurement challenges, 
suggest that difficulty of observing behaviors and difficulty of measuring outcomes have 
important direct effects on effort toward task, and that the ability of outcome control to increase 
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effort toward task is related to the difficulty of measuring outcomes. Moreover, the results 
demonstrate that control does affect performance outcomes in significant ways.   
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